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RECKLESS DISREGARD: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY OF CUTTING
TAXES IN THE FACE OF AN ENORMOUS
FISCAL GAP
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO*
Abstract: The Bush administration's policy of sharply cutting taxes while
increasing government spending is both misguided and harmful. Pre-
sumably rationalized in private as a way of shrinking government over the
long term without paying a current political price, this policy in fact
increases the government's distributional intervention by handing money
to current voters at the expense of younger and future generations.
Moreover, the ballooning fiscal gap may lead to an Argentina-style melt-
down in the U.S. government's position as a borrower in world capital
markets, potentially yielding chronic inflation, unemployment, and bank
and currency crises that may affect our economic productivity for an
indefinite period.
INTRODUCTION
The dominant feature of fiscal policy in the George W. Bush ad-
ministration has been cutting taxes while vastly increasing current and
projected future spending, in the face of an already enormous fiscal
gap. Many commentators have noted the slide of the annual budget
picture from surpluses on the order of $230 billion to deficits exceed-
ing $400 billion.' The trend in the annual numbers is trivial, however,
compared to the long-term picture, which was bad even during the
surplus years, but has grown significantly worse, in large part. due to
the Bush administration's fiscal recklessness. 2
*Wayne Perry Professor of Taxation, New York University School of Law.
1 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET' AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS
2005 ro 2019, at 1 tb1.1-1 (2004) [hereinafter Butiorr AND ECONOMIC OuTtoolt] (projecting
a $477 billion deficit for 2004); Curia, BUDGF.T OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OU11,00K
129 tbl.F-1 (2003) [hereinafter LANG-TERM BUDGET' Oumoott] (noting that the United
States had a budget surplus of $236.4 billion in 2000).
2
 All references to "Bush" or "the Bush administration" refer to George W. Bush unless
otherwise noted.
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Serious disruption is likely to result from the stress that the Bush-
enhanced fiscal gap places on the U.S. political system. There is a ma-
jor possibility of an Argentina-style meltdown in the U.S. govern-
ment's position as a borrower in world capital markets, potentially
yielding chronic inflation, unemployment, and bank and currency
crises.° The increased fiscal gap also will harm future generations and
will cause many current workers, who otherwise could have counted
on lesser (though still significant) reductions in Social Security and
Medicare benefits, to enter retirement with inadequate resources. 4
What could be the Bush administration's rationale for expand-
ing, rather than seeking to narrow, the fiscal gap? Apart from indif-
ference or misunderstanding, along with short-term political expedi-
ence and an eagerness to reward friends, the idea seems to be that the
tax cuts will create strong pressures on the spending side, leading to a
smaller government down the road. (Never mind that the Bush ad-
ministration has increased even non-defense spending, while also
vastly expanding Medicare through the enactment of an unfunded
new prescription drug entitlement.) 5
Unfortunately, the Bush administration's ideological fervor for
tax cuts has caused it to overlook the fact that the likely consequence
of its tax enactments will be a larger government.° The contrary view
of the Bush administration and conservative activists appears to rest
on spending illusion, or confusing the amount of the nominal dollar
flows between individuals and the government with the actual size of
government.? After establishing a more plausible interpretation of
government size as a function of the government's allocative and dis-
tributional effects on the society, it becomes clear that the tax cuts'
main effect over time is likely to be increased wealth redistribution
from younger to older generations.° This is no less a case of govern-
ment activism than taking money from the rich and giving to the
3 See infra notes 137-153 and accompanying text,
4 See infra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
5 See LIDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TRUST FUNDS,
2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE
AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 100 (2004) [hereinafter
2004 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT1 (describing Medicare Part D, which was enacted in
December 2003 to provide prescription drug discount cards (beginning in 2004) and sub-
sidized access to drug insurance coverage (beginning in 2006)), available at hup://www.
ans.hhs,gov/publications/trusteesreport/2004/trpdf,
6 See infra notes 85-133 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 85-133 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 85-133 and accompanying text.
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poor, with the important difference that—even though future genera-
tions may be richer than we are—it is less defensible normatively.
In the end, the Bush administration's tax policy, if assumed to be
at least partly motivated by principle rather than merely short-term
political convenience, brings to mind the words of George Santayana
that "[I]anaticistru consists in redoubling your efforts when you have
forgotten your aim."9 Tax-cutting fervor has been divorced completely
from the underlying premises that might make it appealing, most ob-
viously through the lack of any serious effort at spending discipline,
but more fundamentally through the Bush administration's courting
of a fiscal crisis that is unlikely to advance its presumed ideological
goals. It has created seemingly permanent deficits, but they will not be
permanent because they cannot be. Even in the short run, the 2001-
2003 tax acts have so enhanced instability in the fiscal system that po-
litical rent extraction by Washington politicians from a variety of in-
terest groups can be expected to reach new heights.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses
how the long-term fiscal picture is best analyzed, where the United
States now stands, and the impact of the 2001-2003 tax cuts."' Part 11
examines the "size of government" concept and the likely effects of the
tax cuts. 11 Finally, Part III considers the significance of the fiscal gap."
I. THE LONG-TERM FISCAL PICTURE
A. Inadequacy of Annual Deficits and Sulphises to Describe
the Long-Term Picture
1, Reasons for Concern About Deficits
Annual budget deficits and surpluses are the main measures used
to evaluate the overall long-term budget picture. Deficits have reso-
nated periodically as an American political issue for more than two
centuries." As recently as 1995, a balanced budget amendment to the
U.S. Constitution passed the House of Representatives and fell only
one vote short of Senate approval." Many of the amendment's sup-
9 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, Introduction and Reason in Common Sense, in 'DIE LIFE OF REA-
SON OR 'ME, PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS 13 (1906).
10 See infra notes 13-84 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 85-133 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 134-156 and accompanying text.
13 SCC DANIEL SHAVIRO, Do DEFICITS MATTER? 17-27 (1997).
14 See id, at 256.
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porters, of course, subsequently became avid cheerleaders for bloat-
ing the deficit through the enactment and expansion of George W.
Bush's tax cut proposals.°
The political prominence of deficits partly reflects their symbolic
significance—connoting to the likes of Ross Perot, for example, that
the government must be wasteful, inefficient, and unbusinesslike.°
People also are prone to exaggerate the analogy between public and
private debt, overlooking that the federal government does not face
the same type of default risk as a private individual because it borrows
in its own currency and can raise taxes." Nonetheless, concern about
deficits reflects their perceived relationship with four underlying is-
sues of genuine substance." These issues are as follows:
(a) Generational policy—There has long been concern about leav-
ing future generations the burden of repaying public debt that was
incurred to finance budget deficits.° This concern would disappear
to the extent of Ricardian offsets, or increased saving by altruistically
minded members of current generations to offset the debt burden
left for their heirs." Empirical evidence with strong theoretical back-
ing, however, suggests that Ricardian offsets to the government's fiscal
transfers from future to current generations are extremely limited. 21
(b) Macroeconomic issues—Deficits and surpluses are thought to
affect the macroeconomy in various ways. For example, Keynesian fis-
cal policy traditionally emphasizes the counter-cyclical use of deficits
to counter recession and surpluses to cool off inflation. 22 Other mac-
roeconomic concerns about deficits emphasize whether, as public dis-
saving, they reduce national saving, and whether they lead to higher
interest rates that might make future government borrowing more
costly and might raise the "hurdle rate" for new business investment. 23
(c) Size of government—Conservative opposition to budget deficits,
and greater liberal tolerance thereof, long reflected the belief that
debt financing encouraged higher government spending. The basic
t° For information on the shift by congressional Republicans such as House Majority
Leader Torn Delay, see David Firestone, Conservatives Now See Deficits as a Tool to Fight Spend-
ing, N.Y. Timm, Feb. 11,2003, at A24.
18 SHAVIRO supra note 13, at 25.
"Id. at 15-16.
18
 See generally id.
18 See id. at 151-85.
20 Id. at 66-70.
21 See Stinvnto supra note 13, at 71-78.
22 See id. at 53-55.
23 See id. 186-220.
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idea was that spending programs would be easier to enact if current
taxpayers were not handed the bill immediately and if the assignment
of the cost to anyone could be deferred. Over the last ten years, how-
ever, this has changed fundamentally. Many conservatives (and the
Bush administration) instead have embraced the hypothesis that cut-
ting taxes, and thereby creating large budget deficits, is the best way
to restrain government spending over the long term. Meanwhile, lib-
erals apparently agreeing with the conservatives that taxes rather than
spending levels are the main political variable at the margin, have in-
creasingly favored lower deficits and higher surpluses.
(d) Sustainability of current policy, or degree of specification of a feasible
long-term policy—Over the long run, the present value of the govern-
ment's inflows must equal that of its outlays. This is the basic no-free-
lunch principle, or "budget constraint" in economic parlance, which
holds that everything ultimately must be paid for. Any fiscal policy that
fails to satisfy this constraint is unsustainable and will have to change. 24
For individuals, the government's failure to announce a sustain-
able fiscal policy means that their long-term personal and business
planning must go forward withOut the aid of a credible projection of
its long-term policy course. 25 Those who are reasonably attentive must
decide how to deal with substantial uncertainty, while the inattentive
may face severe shocks when fiscal policy finally does address the
funding gap.26 An example would be entering retirement with inade-
quate savings by reason of Social Security and Medicare cutbacks that
one failed to anticipate. Worse than any of this, however, is the possi-
bility of a severe macroeconomic crisis if investors in world capital
markets lose their confidence that the government is willing and able
to place its fiscal policy on a sustainable course.
2. Deficits' Deficiency as a Measure of the Above Concerns
All four of the above issues are important. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the annual budget deficit or surplus is poorly designed to illumi-
nate any of them.27 The core problem is that it is not an economically
meaningful measure for two reasons. First, it is only a current-year
measure and thus ignores the accrual of future expected cash flows
24 See id. at 147.
25 Sec id. al 147-50.
22 See SHAVIRO supra note 13, at 147-50.
27 See id. at 144.
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between the government and other persons. 28
 Second, it is sensitive to
labeling because amounts denominated as loan principal are ig-
nored. 29 Suppose, for example, that the government officially re-
described the payment of Social Security taxes followed by the receipt
of Social Security benefits, as involving taxpayer loans followed by the
repayment of principal plus interest (plus or minus a transfer to the
extent the benefits did not equal the taxes in value). The result would
be to change dramatically the reported budget deficits or surpluses for
all years, even though nothing would have changed on the ground.
Seventy years ago, these shortcomings of the annual budget
measure might not have mattered as much, despite their inviting
"smoke and mirrors" manipulations, such as postponing outlays for a
day so as to fall in the next fiscal year. With the enactment of Social
Security and Medicare as long-term entitlement programs, however,
the issue of accruing future commitments became too important to
ignore. As experience has shown, consideration of all four of the above
issues can be distorted badly by focusing on annual budget outcomes.
(a) Generational policy—Because Social Security and Medicare are
the two primary tools in our fiscal policy for wealth transfer between
generations, a focus on budget deficits can lead to a radical misunder-
standing of the burdens that we are imposing on future generations. A
classic example arose in the 1950s, when President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, though apparently sincerely concerned about deficits for this
reason, overlooked the fact that, through expansions of Social Security,
he had "presided over a very large redistribution from [younger and
future] generations to the elderly of his day."3° Indeed, this "redistribu-
tion in the 1950s toward the old and away from the young and unborn
was more significant than that of the [deficit-ridden] 1980s."3 '
Suppose Congress in 2003 had provided strict pay-as-you-go payroll
tax financing for the new Medicare prescription drug benefit that it
enacted, thus avoiding any impact on the budget deficit for any year.
The result would nonetheless have been a sizeable wealth transfer from
younger to older generations. Current seniors still would have received
the benefit without paying for it, while younger generations would have
had to pay over time both for their own benefits and for those given to
current seniors. The effect, therefore, would have been comparable to
28 LAURENCE1 KOTLIKOFF, GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING 22 (1992).
29 See id. at 18-19.
30
 Id. at 172.
51 Id.
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that of debt-financed deficit spending on behalf of current seniors, but
debt and deficit measures would have missed it completely.
(b) Macroeconomic issues—Counter-cyclical fiscal policy is probably
the area in which deficits retain the greatest relevance as measures.32
Keynesian stimulus relies in large part on the idea that people are my-
opic or cash-constrained, and hence will adjust their current consttmer
spending, based on this year's cash flows between themselves and the
government, more than they "ought" to if acting rationally on a far-
sighted basis." Even here, however, the annual measure may be mis-
leading insofar as people are not totally myopic, and often take some
account, even if erratically and unpredictably, of changes to their long-
term expectations regarding government policy. 34 Furthermore, be-
cause more farsighted economic actors, including those with significant
stakes in the capital markets, adjust their behavior as well, the fact that
some people are myopic or cash-constrained may cease to have as great
an effect on aggregate behavior as one otherwise might have expected.
In any event, however, the case for discretionary counter-cyclical
policy, or relying on new enactments rather than automatic responses
of tax revenues and certain outlays (such as unemployment benefits)
to the business cycle, was widely discredited by the 1980s on political
economy grounds." The main concerns were that stimulus would
come too late (like a thermostat that detects cold weather in January
but does not turn on until July), and that politicians would use it dis-
ingenuously as a one-way ratchet inviting deficit spending but never
contraction." Discretionary stimulus then enjoyed a pseudo-revival
under the Bush administration—albeit one that merely confirmed the
latter political economy concern—with two distinct strains. The first
was that "[n]o politician wishes to be cast in the title role of les the
Economy, Stupid."37 Thus, Congress in 2002, "remind [ing] us that pol-
icy makers may go where economists fear to tread," actually passed a
conventional stimulus bill with incentives for new investment and ex-
52 See SI1AVIRO, supra note 13, at 205-11.
" See KOTLIKOEE, supra note 28, at 32-33.
54 See id. at 33.
35
 President William .). Clinton proposed a "stimulus plan" in 1993, but it was not en-
acted, and in any event, was accompanied, unlike traditional Keynesian stimulus, by pro-
posed tax increases that were enacted.
" See SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 207-11.
" Alan J. Auerbach, Is Time a Role for Discretionary Fiscal Policy?, in RETHINKING STABILF
ZATION POLICY 109,110 (2002) (offering commentary during symposium sponsored by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City), available at http://wwwkc.frb.org/PUBLICAT
/SYMPOS/2002/pdf/S02auerbach.pdf.
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tension of unemployment. benefits. 38 The second, and perhaps more
significant, strain emerged in 2003, when the Bush administration,
determined to cut taxes but lacking the budget surplus rationale of
2001, hit upon the pretext that more stimulus was needed, notwith-
standing that its new proposals had been designed to meet totally dif-
ferent objectives. For example, they were directed neither to indi-
viduals with high marginal propensities to consume nor, at the
business end, to new investment. The take-away lesson from 2003 was
that, when there is public concern about recession or unemployment
levels, the President (if he controls the policy agenda and lacks intel-
lectual scruples) can make whatever tax cut proposal he likes, labeling
it "stimulus" and holding over his foes the threat of blaming them for
any problems in the economy if it does not pass.
(c) Size of governmenDeficit reduction has never been more than
tangentially related to restricting the size of government." Under some
circumstances, it certainly is plausible that new spending programs will
be harder to enact if under an annual balanced budget requirement,
they would have to be paid for immediately. Yet this is merely one sce-
nario among many, as the last few years have shown through the in-
creasing identification of budget deficits with lower taxes rather than
higher spending. William G. Gale and Brennan Kelly suggest, for ex-
ample, that budget-busting tax cuts tend to be associated with budget-
busting spending increases as periods of fiscal lenity alternate with pe-
riods of fiscal discipline. 40
More fundamentally, however, the effects of current policy choices
on both tax and spending levels must be evaluated over the long term,
not just for a single year. Thus, consider the inadequacy of the annual
budget measure to constrain the enactment of new entitlements, such
as Medicare in 1965 or Medicare prescription drugs in 2003, which
start small but can be expected to grow exponentially, along with their
political constituencies, over time.'"
341 Id. (discussing the job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
147, 116 Stat. 21).
" "Size of government" itself is a slippery concept, as discussed infra notes 85-133 and
accompanying text.
4° WILLIAM G. GALE & BRENNAN KELLY, BROOKINGS INST. & TAX POLICY Cm., THE No
NEW TAXES" PLEDGE 7-9 (2004), available al http://www.brook.edu/views/papers/gale/
20040604.pdf.
41 In 1975, 24.9 million Americans were enrolled in a Medicare program; . by 2004, that
number had increased to 41.7 million. CTS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 2003 DATA
COMPENDIUM: MEDICARE ENROLLEES, SELECTED YEARS (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.
cins.hhs.gov/researchers/pubs/datacompendium/2003/03pg30.pdf (last modified Aug. 25,
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(d) Sustainability of current policy, or degree of specification of a feasible
long-term polity—A government that has the capacity to borrow (or to
print money that people accept) does not need to balance its budget
annually. Furthermore, its performance in this regard in a given year,
or even the level of its accumulated public debt, may offer little in-
formation concerning whether its current or announced fiscal policy
is on a sustainable course. This is especially true in an era in which
programs like Social Security and Medicare, representing stated long-
term commitments and purporting to use dedicated financing, oc-
cupy so large a place in the federal budget. 42
This problem has been officially recognized up to a point,
through the creation of trust fund reporting for Social Security and
Medicare that includes annual projections of program solvency over a
seventy-five year period. 43 These projections, however, even when con-
sidered alongside the annual budget measure, fall considerably short
of offering adequate information. There are three main problems
with relying on the seventy-five year Social Security and Medicare pro-
jections. First, they are limited to taxes and spending under arbitrarily
defined subsets of the fiscal system as a whole. They therefore fail to
offer a comprehensive picture, with the consequence that they can be
(and have been) manipulated by simply changing the revenues or
outlays that are attributed officially to a particular program." Second,
because the projections purport to measure whether the programs
have been self-financing since their inception, they include historical
2004). Medicare benefit payments grew from $3.2 billion in 1967 to $252.6 billion in 2002.
See Ores. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 2003 DATA COMPENDIUM: ADMINIS'IllAnVE/
OPERNI1NG, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gcw/researchers/pubs/datacompendium/2003/
03pg19.pdf (last modified Aug. 25, 2004). Similarly, benefit payments for Medicare Part D are
projected to increase by 9.7% annually from 2006 to 2013, and Part D outlays are estimated
to grow from 0.7% of gross domestic product ("GDP") in 2006 to 3.4% in 2078. 2004 MEDI-
CARE TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
42 See BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 1, at xiv (projecting that Social Se-
curity, Medicare, and Medicaid spending will grow from more than 8% of GDP in 2004 to
over 14% of GDP in 2030).
42 See generally 2004 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT, SUM note 5; !In. or TRS„ FED. OLD-
AGE & SURVIVORS INS. 8c DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABIL-
ITY INSURANCE. TRUST FUNDS (2004) [hereinafter 2004 OASDI Timms REPORT), avail-
able at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04/tr04.pdf (updated Mar. 23, 2004).
44 An example is Congress's decision in 1997 to shift certain home health agency care
from Part A to Part B of Medicare. Because of differences between the Part A and Part B trust
funds, this shift "permit[ted] the government to pretend that Medicare's financing had im-
proved by the entire amount shifted." DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR MEDICARE? 13
(2004).
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information about specified revenues relative to outlays (shown as
positive trust fund balances) that have no direct bearing on whether
current policy is sustainable into the future. Third, seventy-five years
simply is not a long enough period over which to evaluate these pro-
grams. When long-term fiscal imbalances are as severe as they are un-
der existing Social Security and Medicare, truncating the projection
horizon at seventy-five years may result in understating the present
value of the imbalance by two-thirds or more.*
* * *
Thus, annual deficits and surpluses fail to provide adequate in-
formation regarding fiscal policy. For the concerns relating to their
macroeconomic and size-of-government effects, it is not clear what an
improved measure would look like. For generational policy and un-
der-specification, however, improved measures not only are possible,
but have been developed recently.
B. Improved Measures
1. Generational Policy
a. Generational Accounting
To measure the relative lifetime treatment of members of different
age cohorts, the tool of choice is generational accounting. which offers
a measure of lifetime net taxes and lifetime net tax rates;th Lifetime net
taxes equal taxes paid minus transfers received, computed in present
value terms from birth. 47
 Dividing this amount by one's lifetime in-
come, likewise computed in present value terms from birth, provides a
measure of one's lifetime net tax rate. 48
 Thus, suppose that on average
the members of a given age cohort paid lifetime gross taxes of $3.5 mil-
lion, received lifetime transfers of $1 million, and had lifetime income
of $10 million. The average lifetime net tax for members of the cohort
would be $2.5 million, and the lifetime net tax rate would be 25%.
If generational accounting computations were made by assuming
that current policy will continue indefinitely, they would ignore the
45
 JAGADEESII GOKHALE & KENT SMETFERS, FISCAL AND GENERATIONAL IMBALANCES:
NEW BUDGET MEASURES FOR NEW BUDGET PRIORITIES 17 (2003).
43
 KOTLIKOFV, supra note 28, at 22.
47 See id. at 26-28.
45 See id.
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principle that everything ultimately must be paid for. Yet current pol-
icy does not describe how the fiscal gap will be eliminated. Moreover,
assuming a particular response would mean that one was no longer
projecting current policy, but instead making a prediction about fu-
ture policy. Generational accounting responds to this conundrum by
treating the entire revenue shortfall as eliminated through a net tax
increase on future generations. 49
The operating assumption, therefore, is that everyone alive today,
including newborns, will not have to pay for any of the fiscal gap, leav-
ing those born next year or thereafter to bear it in full." This is con-
cededly unrealistic and is meant to provide "an informative counter-
factual, not a likely policy scenario."51 It does, however, indicate the
trend implied by current policy because delaying the necessary fiscal
changes tends to leave the burden to be borne by future generations.
To the extent that future generations are shown to have higher life-
time net tax rates than current generations, it is clear that higher
burdens either are assigned to them expressly, or will have to be
borne by them if the fiscal gap is not addressed while present genera-
tions remain on the scene.
The President's Annual Budget briefly included generational ac-
counting forecasts, but this practice ceased during the William J. Clin-
ton administration, reportedly because senior officials found them too
embarrassing given the political emphasis on current budget sur-
pluses.52 Generational accounting proponents continued for a while to
issue periodic forecasts, using Congressional Budget Office ("CBO")
projections but with certain revisions to the present course of tax policy
and discretionary spending as well as to assumed discount and growth
rates. A forecast shortly before the enactment of the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the "2001 Act") showed life-
time net tax rates of 17.68% for current newborns and 35.81% for fu-
ture geneiations, suggesting that the fiscal gap (the key source of the
difference) would more than double lifetime net tax burdens, perpetu-
ally into the future, if not addressed while members of current genera-
45 LAURENCE j, KOTLIROFF, THE COMING GENERATIONAL STORM 22 (2001), available at
http://econ.bu.edu/kotlikoff/GenerationalStorm.pdf.
5° See id.
51 Id.
52 See H.R. REP. No. 104-575, at 34 (1995) ("The President's fiscal year 1995 budget
contained an entire chapter on generational accounting.... The President's budget sub-
mission this year excludes the chapter on generational accounting, probably because the
outlook has worsened.").
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tions are still alive." No estimates have been issued since that time, but
the disparity is probably much greater now because the fiscal gap (dis-
cussed below) has increased several-fold, reflecting both revised long-
term forecasts and the impact of the 2001-2003 tax changes.
b. The Generational Imbalance
A measure of lifetime net tax rates may be a bit too abstract to of-
fer a compelling snapshot view of big policy choices like the recent tax
cuts or Medicare prescription drug benefit. For that purpose, a meas-
ure stated in dollars would be preferable. Although other candidates
have been suggested, my own suggestion involves the use of what I call
the "generational transfer" measure for policy changes. 54 This is a pre-
sent-value measure of how a given proposal would change genera-
tional distribution on a going-forward basis relative to prior policy.
To illustrate both the measure and its limitations, a current illus-
tration of the generational transfer measure may help. Jagadeesh
Gokhale and Kent Smetters projected that, as of 2002, current gen-
erations, defined as people then over the age of fourteen, would re-
ceive net benefits, or transfers in excess of taxes, worth $10.1 trillion
from Social Security and $15.4 trillion from Medicare. 55 Current gen-
erations also were projected to pay, over the rest of their lives, taxes
(other than for Social Security and Medicare) with a present value of
$32.6 trillion. 55
 Overall, then, these people would pay remaining life-
time net taxes of $7.1 trillion (the excess of the other taxes over the
net Social Security and Medicare benefits). 57
Considered in isolation, this figure has little meaning. To begin
with, it carries no implication that current generations are net losers
55 KOTLIKOFF, supra note 49, at 28.
54 Cf. GOKHALE & SMErIERS, supra note 45, at 11. Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smet-
ters propose using a measure of "generational imbalance," which they define as the pre-
sent value of remaining outlays to current generations minus the present value of remain-
ing taxes to be paid by current generations (along with government assets). They state
that, although generational imbalance can be computed for programs such as Social Secu-
rity and Medicare, that provide cash to or on behalf of specific beneficiaries, it cannot be
computed for government policy as a whole because the benefits of outlays (such as
spending on national defense or public infrastructure) cannot easily be allocated to dif-
ferent generations.... Only the revenue side of the rest-of-government's budget may be so
attributed." Id. at 13. This strikes me as a bit over-scrupulous. So long as we understand the
limitations to what we are doing, there is nothing wrong with a purely fiscal measure that
overlooks the value of in-kind benefits.
55 See id. at 26-27 tbl.2.
56 See id.
57 See id.
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from fiscal policy, even on a going-forward basis. After all, it excludes
the value of in-kind services received from the government. Such
value would not have to be high—indeed, twenty-two percent of the
value of the $32.6 trillion in taxes would suffice—in order for current
generations to be net winners from fiscal policy on a going-forward
basis.58 Even that, however, would carry no implication that current
generations are net winners on a lifetime basis. The basic point of So-
cial Security and Medicare is to provide individuals with benefits after
retirement in exchange for taxes paid during their working years.
Thus; the fact that a group, such as current generations, that includes
many older people should be net winners from the present moment
until the end of their lives does not really illuminate how these people
have been treated overall.
Suppose, however, that a given policy change, such as expanding
the Medicare prescription drug benefit, would reduce the remaining
lifetime net tax for current generations from $7.1 trillion to, say, $5
trillion. This would indicate that the policy involved a $2.1 trillion
transfer to people over the age of fourteen, evidently from those who
are younger or as yet unborn. In a sense, this repeats the assumption
of generational accounting that future generations will pay in full for
the change, but there is less risk of confusion regarding the point that
is being made. Rather than seeming to project the actual course of
future policy (as people often seem to think generational accounting
does), we are simply measuring what this enactment would do absent
other future enactments.
One further refinement would make the generational transfer
measure more informative still. Suppose we disaggregated further into
more distinct age groups, such as the following four groups: (a) future
generations, defined as the unborn plus those who are currently four-
teen or younger; (b) the young, defined as those from ages fourteen to
forty; (c) the middle-aged, or those from ages forty to sixty; and (d) the
old, or those age sixty and above. This potentially would be a most il-
luminating measure.
There are two problems with the generational transfer measure.
First, increasing the fiscal gap would appear to be a win for all current
voters, Emphasizing that the gain came at the expense of future gen-
erations, however, would help illustrate the core point about genera-
tional policy, which is that (leaving aside efficiency issues) it is a zero-
sum game. It would have been interesting to hear the Bush admini-
" See id.
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stration explain why transferring trillions of dollars from future to
current generations through the 2001-2003 tax cuts and the Medi-
care prescription drug benefit was a desirable policy move.
Second, consider a tax cut that is financed by reducing in-kind
government services to the people who would have paid the taxes.
The generational transfer measure treats those people as benefiting
from the full amount of the tax cut, rather than simply from the ex-
cess, if any, of the taxes over the value of the services they otherwise
would have received. This oversight is unfortunate, but unavoidable
with fiscal measures that operate against the background of valuation
difficulties for government services. If this point makes the genera-
tional transfer measure undesirably confusing, then presumably all
tax distribution tables should be eliminated as well.
2. Policy Sustainability or Specification
In Do Deficits Matter?, I called for a measure of our fiscal policy's
current under-specification, projected forward over an unlimited time
horizon, although I showed an unfortunate rhetorical tin ear by call-
ing the proposed measure "tax lag" or the "economic accrual national
debt."59
 One of the first major efforts by economists to make such a
computation more felicitously called it the "fiscal gap," defined as
"the size of the long-run increase in taxes or reductions in non-
interest expenditures (as a constant share of GDP) that would be re-
quired immediately" in order to keep current government debt con-
stant as a percentage of gross domestic product ("GDP"). 60
 In this
formulation, "the fiscal gap is stated as a flow, like the annual budget
deficit or the amount you must pay each year on a bank loan. The
fiscal gap can also be stated as a stock, like the national debt or the
principal you owe on a bank loan."61
Taking into account the 2001 tax changes, but assuming that they
would remain in effect permanently rather than being "sunsetted"
after 2010, and also making certain other reasonable adjustments to
official CBO projections, the "flow" fiscal gap as of 2002 was estimated
to stand at 11.07% of GDP. 62
 This implied a "stock" fiscal gap of about
59 See SIIAVIRO, supra note 13, at 4-5.
60 Alan J. Auerbach et al., The Budget Outlook and Options for Fiscal Policy, 95 TAx No ms
1639, 1648 (2002). The fiscal gap was first described in Alan J. Auerbach, The U.S. Fiscal
Problem: Where We Are How We Got Here, and Where We're Going, in 9 NUR MACROECONOM-
ICS ANNUAL 1904, at 141, 166-73 (Stanley Fischer & Julio Rotemberg eds., 1994).
61
 Daniel N. Shaviro, The Growing U.S. Fiscal Gap, WORLD ECON. J., Oct.—Dec. 2002, at 2.
67 See Auerbach et al., supra note 60, at 1644 tbl.4.
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$74 trillion if one discounted future cash flows at a 3% rate and as-
sumed that real GDP would grow at an annual rate of 1.5%. 03
The most recent estimates (as of early 2004), suggest a total fiscal
gap of $73 trillion." This amount represents the sum of the following
totals (rounded to the nearest trillion dollars):
(1) According to the latest report of the Social Security Trustees, an
unfunded Social Security obligation through the infinite ho-
rizon of $10.4 trillion ; 65
(2) According to the latest report of the Medicare Trustees, an un-
funded obligation through the infinite horizon of $21.8 tril-
lion for Part A of Medicare (pertaining to hospitalization
benefits);6°
(3) According to the latest report of the Medicare Trustees, a need
for infinite horizon general revenue contributions of $23.2
trillion to pay for Part B of Medicare (pertaining to outpa-
tient care) ; 67
(4) According to the latest report of the Medicare Trustees, a need
for infinite horizon general revenue contributions of $16.6
trillion to pay for the new prescription drug benefit; 68 and
(5) According to a recent estimate by economists jagadeesh Gokhale
and Kent Smetters, an infinite horizon fiscal imbalance, as of
2004, of $753 billion for the entire federal government apart
from Social Security and Medicare.69
In one key sense, the $73 trillion forecast is wildly over-optimistic.
It projects future tax revenues by assuming the continuation of the
laws on the books, although in two important respects these laws do
not describe actual, currently intended policies in a credible way.
Shaviro, supra note 61, at 2-3.
64 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
66 2004 OASDI TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 43, at 59 tb1,1V.B.7.
66 2004 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 5, at 60 tbl.H.B11.
67 Id. at 99 tbl.ILC16.
66 Id. at 109 tb1.11.G23.
69 See GOKIIALE & SMErrERS, supra note 45, at 26-27 tb1.2. Using President Bush's 2003
budget as the baseline for future policy, jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters estimated in
2002 that the total fiscal gap as of 2004 would be "only" $46.9 trillion, See id. This lower esti-
mate reflected, among other things, an assumption that the prescription drug enactment
would cost only $7 to $12 trillion. See The Cost of Adding a Placa ption-Drug Benefit to Medicare:
Hearing &fore the Subcomm, on Human Rights and Wellness, House Comm. on Government Reform,
108th Cong. 4 (2003) (statement of Joseph R. Antos Itcjagadeesh Gokhale, American Enter-
prise Institute), available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/F031.07.16%20Testi-
mony%20of%20joseph%20Antos%20-%20AE11.pdf.
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First, in passing the Bush taiepts, Congress provided that the entire
2001 Act, and many of the *Visions in the Jobs and Growth Tax Re-
lief Reconciliation Act of 2003 . (the "2003 Act"), would expire (bar-
ring future legislation) within periods ranging from two to nine
years." The main reason for these "sunsets"—which proponents of
the two Acts insisted would not be permitted to take effect—was to
lower the official ten-year estimates of the Acts' revenue cost by more
than fifty percent. 71 Thus, looking at either what the proponents
openly intended or the likely resolution of the politically unrealistic
policy path suggested by the sunsets, the sunsets result in a
significantly higher estimate of the fiscal gap.
Second, the $73 trillion forecast reflects assumptions that noth-
ing will be done to rein in the rapid growth of the alternative mini-
mum tax (the "AMT"), a parallel tax system to the regular income tax
that uses lower rates but a broader base, ostensibly to ensure that
people do not over-use tax preferences. 72 Until 2000, less than one
percent of taxpayers paid the AMT in any given year." Under current
law, however, the CHO estimates that the number of taxpayers paying
the AMT will grow from just over one million in 2001 to nearly thirty
million in 2010—at which time the AMT will be paid by more than
60% of taxpayers earning between $50,000 and $100,000, more than
90% of those earning between $100,000 and $200,000, and more than
80% of those earning between $200,000 and $500,000. 74 This level of
AMT application seems likely to be politically intolerable given the
compliance burdens of functioning under two parallel tax systems. A
fix would be extremely costly, however. It was recently estimated that,
for the years 2005 through 2014, repeal of the AMT would cost $660
billion if the 2001 Act is allowed to expire, and $1.09 trillion if the Act
is extended." They also have estimated that, by 2008, repealing the
AMT would be costlier than repealing the regular income tax while
retaining the AMT."
7° See William G. Gale & Peter K. Orszag, Sunsets in the Tax Code, 99 TAX NOTES 1553,
1554 (2003).
71 See id. at 1553.
72 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TH E ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 1 (Apr. 15, 2004), available
at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/53xx/doc5386/04-15-AMT.pdf.
73 Id. at 2.
74 See id. at 2-4.
71 LEONARD E. BURMAN ET AL., URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY Cm., KEY POINTS
ON THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, at http://www.brookings.ed u/views/op-ed /gale/
20040121ann.htm (Jan. 21, 2004).
76 Id.
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The growth of the AMT has two main causes. First, an income ex-
emption amount that it uses to reduce the number of individuals who
are subject to it is not indexed to inflation, and this continually de-
clines in real value unless expressly increased. Second, by sharply cut-
ting the regular tax without addressing the AMT, the Bush administra-
tion put many more people on the latter system because the AMT is
payable when it exceeds regular tax liability. If people have to pay the
greater of A and B, sufficiently cutting A inevitably shifts people to B.
It would have been bad enough if the Bush administration, when
deciding how to structure its 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, merely had failed
to prioritize adequately the need to address the AMT. This already
would have been irresponsible, given the magnitude of the AMT prob-
lem and the difficulty of solving'. it straightforwardly given the overall
fiscal gap. What is even worse, however, is that the AMT, like the sun-
sets, appears to have been a deliberate tool in the Bush administration's
characteristic, Iraq War-style willingness to engage in crude, shameless,
and shortsighted deception. Specifically, the AMT aided enactment of
the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts by gulling voters and taxpayers who did not
read the fine print. Projected AMT revenues permitted the official es-
timates of the cost of the enactments to be hundreds of billions of dol-
lars lower, without widespread understanding that, for example, by
2009 people earning between $100,000 and $500.000 would be losing
more than 50% of their Bush tax cuts to the AMT."
C. Resilience of the Fiscal Pidure
Obviously, any estimate of the U.S. fiscal gap over an infinite time
horizon is extremely sensitive to economic and demographic assump-
tions and highly subject to significant change from year to year even if
policy remains constant. This is no ground for dismissing its
significance, however. As Alan Auerbach and Kevin Hassett have
noted, risk aversion suggests that we should be mare concerned, not
less, about a risky fiscal gap than we would be about one with the
same expected value but that was fixed."
Moreover, the prediction of a huge fiscal gap is quite resilient. It
does not, for example, vary sharply with the business cycle in the
77 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Should the President's Tax Cuts Be Made Perma-
nent?. 102 Tax NO175 1277, 1284 tb1.3 (2004).
78 See Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin Hassett, Uncertainty and the Design of Long-Run Fiscal Pol-
icy, in DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND FISCAL POLICY 73, 91 (Alan J. Auerbach & Ronald D.
Lee eds., 2001).
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manner of the annual budget deficit or surplus. The resilience of the
fiscal gap to new information or revised assumptions reflects the fact
that its two principal causes, population aging due to increasing life
expectancy and growth in U.S. healthcare expenditure relative to
GDP, are considered highly resilient."
Might economic growth provide the cure? Anglo-American his-
tory, such as that of England after the Napoleonic Wars and the
United States after the Civil War, shows that enormous public debts
can simply be outgrown if the economy takes off sufficiently. 8° The
current U.S. fiscal gap, however, appears to be growth-proof because
various expenditure programs, no less than taxes, are pegged to GDP
over the long run. In particular, Social Security benefits are indexed
to rising wage levels and thus to. productivity growth, while the Medi-
care fiscal gap is actually worsened by GDP growth if healthcare ex-
penditures rise in conjunction with, but faster than, GDP. Recent es-
timates have shown, therefore, that a greater than expected rise in
GDP actually might make the fiscal gap larger rather than smaller.$"
Thus, we are likely to have to deal with the fiscal gap in the reasonably
near future regardless of economic growth.
The only plausible change to projected trends that could reduce
the fiscal gap drastically is a decline in the rate at which healthcare
expenditures grow relative to the economy. In theory, it is possible
that technological advances could have this effect. Consider, for ex-
ample, the use of a cheap pill to clear up heart problems without ex-
pensive surgery, or the prospect of deferring end-of-life expenditures,
which often are quite high, by enabling people to live longer.
Historically, however, technological advances have continually
increased healthcare's share of the economy. 82 This trend is probably
demand-driven and likely to continue until incentives in the health-
care industry are changed significantly. Medicare, which virtually
eliminates seniors' incentive to be cost-conscious in seeking covered
"For information on rising life expectancy, see Ronald Lee & Ryan Edwards, The Fis-
cal Effects of Population Aging in the U.S.: Assessing the Uncertainties, in 16 TAX POLICY AND Tim
ECONOMY 141, 171-74 ( James M. Poterba ed., 2002). For information on the expected
continued rise in healthcare expenditure relative to GDP, see VICTOR R. Fuchs, PROVIDE,
PROVIDE: THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 4-5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 6642, 1998).
63 See SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 20-21,32.
81 See GOKIIALE & SME'L T 'ERS, supra note 45, at 38-40.
82 SHAVIRO, supra note 44, at 87 (citing SHERRY !CUED, CiIRONIC CONDITION: WHY
HEALTH REFORM FAILS 91 (1997)).
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healthcare, is only part of the problem. 85 Even for people under the
age of sixty-five, cost-consciousness is the exception rather than the
rule. The income tax exclusion for employer-provided healthcare
gives employees an incentive to over-insure, even if this results in
wasteful expenditure that increases the cost of their coverage. 84
 Plus,
perhaps less significantly, Medicaid reduces the cost-consciousness of
beneficiaries in seeking healthcare. When the great majority of
healthcare consumers have so little reason to be cost-conscious, not
only will they use the technology, at hand in an uneconomical way, but
the firms developing new treatments will tailor the products that they
choose to develop for this audience. Thus, we cannot anticipate a
change in the rate of healthcare expenditure growth—other than one
forced on consumers by a wrenching political change—to render the
fiscal gap less onerous than it now appears.
Why would the Bush administration have sought enormous tax
cuts in the face of an enormous fiscal gap that was well known to lead-
ing economists even amid the budget surpluses of the late 1990s?
Without getting too ad hominem about it, one should note that a key
reason for the Bush administration's eagerness to slash taxes was ideo-
logical, relating to anti-tax and anti-government sentiment that in re-
cent decades increasingly has swept conservative and Republican
thought. What if the advocates of the tax cuts had it backwards, how-
ever, and enacting enormous tax cuts in the face of a large fiscal gap
was not actually a step toward smaller government?
II. WERE THE 2001-2003 TAX CUTS STEPS TOWARD A
SMALLER GOVERNMENT?
A. The Anti-Government Agenda That May Have Helped Motivate the
2001-2003 Tax Cuts
For many decades, a dominant theme in American conservative
thought and politics has been battling "big government." Although
partly waged on the regulatory front, the main action for at least
three decades has centered on the fiscal system and is well conveyed
by President Ronald Reagan's famous, oft-repeated charge that the
Democrats liked nothing better than to "tax and spend." 85 Conserva-
85 Id. at 27-30.
84 Id. at 19-20.
95 See, e.g., President Ronald W. Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Economic
Growth and Budget Reform, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1626, 1626 (Dec. 13, 1986), available at
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tive Republican advocacy of tax cuts, after premiering at the national
level in Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign and the ensuing
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, became a core ideological and
policy aim with the promulgation of the "Contract with America" in
the 1994 congressional campaign, and then bore fruit in the enact-
ment of the 2001-2003 tax cuts.
Controversial as the tax cuts have been, their supporters and op-
ponents alike generally agree that they are steps toward smaller gov-
ernment. Although merely reducing the government's tax take for
now as spending continues to rise, they put our long-term fiscal policy
on so unsustainable a course as to portend a need for much tighter
spending controls in the future—including cuts in Social Security and
Medicare because so much money is spent on those programs. 88
This may be deliberate, reflecting anti-government sentiment,
even though the Bush administration has simultaneously supported
vast spending increases including a $16.6 trillion Medicare prescrip-
tion drug benefit.87
 Although the Bush administration itself has been
circumspect about the pressures on future spending created by its tax
policy, well-connected conservative activists are more forthcoming.
Tax-cutting advocate Grover Norquist, for example, states that his
"` goal is to cut government in half in twenty-five years,'" and thus "'to
get it clown to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub.'" 88
The English writer Saki once observed, "When one's friends and
enemies agree on any particular point they are usually wrong." 89 So it
is this time. The point of agreement between supporters and oppo-
nents of President Bush's tax policy, that the 2001-2003 tax cuts are
steps toward smaller government, reflects a shared misunderstanding
of what the notion "size of government" can be reasonably inter-
preted to mean. More specifically, it rests on spending illusion, or
confusing the amount of the nominal dollar flows between individuals
and the government with the actual size of government. Once we de-
velop a more plausible interpretation of government size, we can see
htip://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1986/121386a.htm
 (last visited Oct.
15, 2004).
86 See BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 1, at xiv (observing that Social Se-
curity, Medicare, and Medicaid spending currently account for more than 8% of GDP and
projecting that, even under moderate assumptions, spending will increase to over 14% of
GDP in 2030).
87 See 2004 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 5, at 109 tb1.11.C23.
88 Robert Dreyfuss, Grover Norquist: "Field Marshal" of the Bush Tax Plan, THE NATION,
May 14, 2001, at 12 (quoting Grover Norquist).
82 SAKI, THE UNBEARABLE BASSINGTON 15 (Oxford Univ. Press 1982) (1912).
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that the 2001-2003 tax cuts are probably steps on the road to larger-
government because their main effect will be to increase wealth redis-
tribution from younger to older generations.
B. Evaluating the Size of Government
1. A No-Government Baseline?
The size of government is an empirical idea, presumably con-
cerned with the magnitude of the government's effect on some set of
outcomes. For convenience, one can divide the outcomes of greatest
relevance to tax policy into the following two categories: allocative out-
comes, concerning how society's resources are used, and distributional
outcomes, concerning how the resources are divided between people.
An immediate problem in evaluating the size of government, in
terms of effects on allocation and distribution, is that one must ask,
compared to what? A no-government state of nature may have initial
logical appeal as the counterfactual baseline. This, however, seems to
require a thought experiment—asking what society would look like if
government did not exist—that requires not just speculation but mo-
tivation. Even if one could specify empirically just what a no-
government world would look like, one next would have to explain
why this would be relevant to our assessments of the actual world in
which we live. Libertarians imagining the state of nature may grant it
privileged normative status in determining which distributional poli-
cies are permitted or just." They are all too prone, however, as Liam
Murphy and Thomas Nagel tartly note, to "imagine life roughly as it is
now, with jobs, banks, houses, and cars, and lacking only the most ob-
vious government services such as Social Security, the National En-
dowment for the Arts, and the police."9' They overlook that property
is a "legally constructed social relation," and that without. government,
"there would be no right to use, enjoy, destroy, or dispose of the
things we own."92
 If one interprets the hypothetical state of nature in
light of what actually would happen if the government suddenly and
magically disappeared or had never existed to begin with, it is plausi-
ble to think that we would find ourselves in a Hobbesian world where
90 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 3-4 (1985); ROBERT NOZICE, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974).
Si LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 16
(2002).
92
 STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, TINE COST OF RIGirrs: WHY LIBERTY DE-
PENDS ON TAXES 59 (1999).
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"everyone's level of welfare would be very low and ... roughly equal"
(because opportunities to earn and save would be limited) and in-
deed where the world's population would be far lower than we ob-
serve under the actual circumstances."
The no-government world would be too remote from the actual
one to help in measuring the size of government even if we more op-
timistically imagined a Lockean state of nature in which people gen-
erally accepted that "no one ought to harm another in his life, health,
liberty, or possessions."94
 As Barbara Fried notes, there is no discerni-
ble basis for assuming that people's talents would have similar, or even
the same proportionate, value in such a world as in the actual one. 95
Moreover, there is no reason to think the economy would look any-
thing like our actual one. Thus, we really have no way of comparing
distributional or allocative outcomes in that world to our actual one,
even leaving aside the motivation for the comparison.
Does this mean we cannot make any sense or practical use of the
"size of government" concept? If it did, then exposure of the libertar-
ian error in ignoring the government's role in establishing markets
and property rights would mean that one could not distinguish be-
tween, for example, the government's allocative and distributional
role in the 1880 American economy and in the 1980 Soviet economy.
One need not embrace the libertarian error, however, in order to ac-
cept that the government, having established the prerequisites for a
stable social order, can vary the level of its further interventions, both
allocative and distributional.
A measure of the size of government ought to be designed in light
of the main issues that we want it to illuminate. In this instance, liber-
tarianism is at one pole of the underlying dispute, and socialism at the
other. At the libertarian pole, market outcomes, once their precondi-
tions have been established, prevail without any further government
intervention. At the socialism pole, government decisionmakers not
only establish background institutions, but also exert ongoing control
over production and distribution. In between the two poles, where all
93 MURPHY & NAGE1„ supra note 91, at 16-17.
"JOHN LOCKE, Two TREAT1SE$ OF GOVERNMENT 6 (Henry Regnery Co. 1955) (1690).
to See Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 157,
176-77 (1999). Barbara Fried notes, for example, "the enormous gains society bestows on
those whose natural talents have little use value on [a] Crusoeian island," as in the case of
"Wayne Cretzky alone on a desert island, thinking of inventing a game called hockey if he
could ever find ice, eleven other players, and an audience to pay to watch," thus permit-
ting him (as in the actual late twentieth century United States) to earn $20 million per
year. Id.
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countries with market economies find themselves, governments at-
tempt in varying degrees, through government production, regulatory
commands, and fiscal tools such as taxes, transfers, and subsidies, to
exert some influence over allocative and distributional outcomes. The
deeper underlying question in steering between the two poles goes to
the relative merits and defects of market and government processes,
and to the value or disvalue of redistribution (relative to the libertarian
pole), such as from rich to poor or healthy to sick.
Against this background, a measure of government size has two
related advantages. It can provide some sort of index or comparative
measure for showing where we are—as compared, for example, to
other countries or to where a given policy change would put us. In
addition, given that people likely are making assumptions about gov-
ernment size anyway (as in Ronald Reagan's "tax and spend" charge),
a well-grounded measure can prevent us from being misled by alter-
natives that are cruder and more formalistic, and hence, more ma-
nipulable.
Because libertarianism is at one pole in the underlying policy de-
bate, its assumptions (although erroneous) can be used reasonably in
constructing the baseline against which government size is measured.
In effect, in the course of measuring the government's interventions
beyond simply establishing the prerequisites for a functioning market
economy, one may indulge in the fiction that "life roughly as it is now,
with jobs, banks, houses, and cars" would exist in any event." In eco-
nomics jargon, this is a partial equilibrium analysis, or one that con-
siders only the relatively direct ramifications of government rules and
programs. As such, its use can be illuminating, given near-universal
acceptance of at least the minimal libertarian state, so long as one
keeps in mind that its baseline is merely a convenient reference point,
too arbitrarily constructed to have the normative status often claimed
by libertarians.
2. Evaluating the "Size of Government" Allocatively and
Distributionally
Actually constructing a size of government measure is well be-
yond the scope of this Article. The use of a single metric would be
questionable in any event, given the multi-dimensional character of
the problem. Consider, for example, the question of how to integrate
" See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 91, at 16.
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the degree of redistribution with the scope of civil liberties and with
the legal system's method of coordinating competing property claims.
Instead, this Part briefly considers the government's effects on alloca-
tion and distribution through explicit taxes and spending as well as
regulatory provisions that can be conceptualized as tax or spending
equivalents. My aim is simply to establish enough of a background
understanding to permit preliminary consideration of the size of gov-
ernment effects of the 2001-2003 tax cuts, as opposed to trying to
bring the measurement process anywhere near to fruition.
Allocatively, one might start by measuring the goods and services
that the government directly supplies. Cost rather than value might
need to be the metric, on the ground that efforts to specify the latter
would be too difficult and controversial.97 To this, however, one might
want to add the allocative consequences of people's responses to gov-
ernment rules that change the relative prices of different commodi-
ties. The word "changes," of course, implies a preexisting set of prices,
but here we might think in terms of the neutrality notion that is
commonly used in public economics. A lump sum tax, for example,
such as a uniform head tax, does not affect relative prices, whereas
consumption and income taxes raise the price of market consump-
tion relative to leisure. Income taxation additionally raises the price of
future consumption relative to current consumption.
The government also can affect allocation through income ef-
fects, such as the changes in consumption that result from redistribu-
tion between people with different preferences. An example would be
reducing national saving, wholly without regard to incentives to save,
by transferring wealth from high savers to low savers. Should income
effects be included when we evaluate the size of government, even
though, once the redistribution (accounted for separately) has oc-
curred, they simply reflect consumer preferences and market forces?
The answer to this question depends on what we actually care about
when we debate the proper size of government.
Consider two examples. In the first example, the government
takes money from people who do not like ice cream and gives it to
people who do. As a result, even though ice cream lovers are free to
spend the transfers however they like, more ice cream is sold, simply
through the normal operations of our market economy. In the second
97 See DAVID F. BRADFORD, REFORMING BUDGETARY LANGUAGE 15-17 (Gtr. for Econ.
Studies & 1fo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 619, 2001), available at
http://www.cesifo.de/pIs/guestci/download/F5648/619.PDE
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example, tracking actual Social Security, the government takes money
from young people and gives it to old people. This reduces national
saving because older people, having less of an extended future to
worry about, tend not to save as Much. The well-founded (though not
uncontroversial) view that Social Security historically has done just
this is prominent in the debate concerning program reform." Logi-
cally, it is exactly parallel to the ice cream example, but there is a
significant difference. We care more about saving than about ice
cream consumption—in economic parlance, because it may have
positive externalities. When it comes to ice cream, leaving aside the
health effects of calories and cholesterol, there is really no reason for
anyone but the consumer to care how much ice cream he or she has.
Let the consumer's tastes determine the answer. Increased national
saving, however, is thought by many to benefit people other than the
savers themselves—in particular, younger people and future genera-
tions, who may benefit if productive use of the savings enables them
to live in a more affluent society.
Suppose that someone, therefore, complains that the government,
by creating a huge, unfunded Social Security system in 1935, reduced
national saving to today's detriment. To say that this is not really part of
the "size of government" because it merely reflected market forces at
work given the underlying wealth transfer would seem strained at best,
desperate at worst. The bottom line, unfortunately, can be no clearer
than this: we care about wealth effects when we care about them.
Distributionally, one might start by netting people's taxes against
their transfers, and then comparing their net taxes to their net
benefits from other government policies, such as the provision of
public goods. A system of pure benefit taxation, if it could be ade-
quately defined in terms of properly relating net taxes to net benefits,
might then emerge as the no-redistribution baseline. This, in turn,
should be done on a lifetime basis, comparing lifetime net taxes to
lifetime net benefits. This calculation would resemble generational
accounting, which measures people's lifetime net tax rates as a per-
centage of their lifetime incomes, while ignoring public goods provi-
sion because the benefit therefrom is too hard to measure. Due to the
public goods problem, benefit taxation has proven difficult even to
°8 See DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 86, 131-32 (2000).
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define, and grave empirical measurement difficulties would remain
even if a given definition were accepted. 99
Libertarians sometimes claim that a flat-rate tax—whether on in-
come, consumption, or something else—is as close to a benefit tax as
one can practically come, and thus constitutes "an indispensable part
of the Lockean program of taxation."'" Barbara Fried has refuted this
argument, suggesting that it is merely political fallback for people
who oppose the distributional consequences of a progressive rate
structure but assume that regressive rates and uniform head taxes are
politically out of bounds.u" Still, where we observe large differences,
going in the same direction, both in lifetime net taxes and in lifetime
net tax rates, it is reasonable to infer that redistribution is afoot, going
from the high-tax to the low-tax individuals, unless there is reason to
think that the tax-side difference is being systematically offset by a
matching benefit-side difference.
We therefore have a very rough basis for evaluating the likely ef-
fects of the 2001-2003 tax cuts on the allocative and distributional size
of government. Do they seem likely to increase or reduce the gov-
ernment's allocative effect on the economy via direct provision of
goods and services plus responses to its effects on relative prices? And
do they seem likely to increase or reduce redistribution, gauged by
differences in lifetime net taxes or tax rates, if we have no reason to
think that any such differences are being offset on the benefit side?
3. Inadequacy of Gross "Tax" and "Spending" Dollar Flows as Proxies
for the Size of Government
One more preliminary step remains before considering the tax
cuts enacted in 2001-2003. I suggested above that the Grover Norquist
theory that massive tax cuts can be used to "'cut government in half ...
[so] we can drown it in the bathtub'" relies on spending illusion, or
confusion between the actual size of government and the gross
amounts of the nominal dollar flows between the government and pri-
vate persons that are denominated as "taxes" and "spending."'" There
certainly are situations in which Grover Norquist would be correct in
99 See, e.g., James R. 1-lines Jr., What Is Benefit Taxation?, 751 Pun. ECON. 483, 483-84
(2000); LOUIS KAPLOW, PUBLIC GOODS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 8-9 (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9842, 2003).
100 Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, in PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 49, 70 (Jules
Coleman & Ellen Frankel Paul eds., 1987).
101 See Fried, supra note 95 at 173-79.
102 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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assuming that we can reduce the size of government by cutting taxes
and spending. For example, reducing government spending on na-
tional defense and public education by $50 billion per year and cutting
taxes by the same amount presumably makes the government smaller,
at least allocatively. Things are not always this straightforward, however,
especially not in the currently prevailing long-term budgetary setting.
For an initial example of spending illusion, suppose we use pref-
erential income tax rules (such as special deductions or credits) to
pursue the very same allocative policies that might otherwise have
been pursued through a broader-based, more neutral income tax plus
explicit government appropriations. Use of the special tax benefits
caused both taxes and spending to be nominally lower than under the
direct appropriations route. Yet the government cannot really be
smaller if we stipulate (as is entirely plausible) that the alternative sets
of rules have the same allocative and distributional effects.
Social Security and Medicare, under which people pay taxes dur-
ing their working years and then get benefits after reaching age sixty-
five, help to suggest further illustrations, which for convenience initially
can involve debt financing. Suppose Jill and Bill live in a two-person,
two-period society. In Period One, the government spends $10.00 sup-
plying a public good that benefits Jill and Bill equally. It finances the
expenditure by borrowing the entire $10.00 from Jill at the market in-
terest rate of 10% per period. In Period Two, when the government
owes Jill $11.00 (and does not supply any further public goods), it must.
choose between (a) levying a uniform head tax of $5.50 in order to
raise the money it owes her and (b) reneging on the debt.
Suppose first that the government reneges. Using formal, conven-
tional definitions of taxes and spending, this means that it will have
levied taxes of zero in both periods while spending $10.00 in Period
One and zero in Period Two. By contrast, if the government levies the
head tax, Period Two taxes rise from zero to $11.00, and Period Two
spending rises from zero to $1.00. 03 Thus, from the standpoint of
spending illusion, reneging appears to lead to smaller government. In
fact, however, it would mean that over the two periods, the govern-
ment engaged in substantial redistribution from Jill to Bill, rather than
zero redistribution, while supplying the same public goods.
103 Payments of interest on government bonds, but not repayments of bond principal,
are treated as spending in official government measures such as that of the annual budget
deficit or surplus.
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Libertarians might not like the decision to renege in Period Two
because it involves the expropriation of a contract right, and thus a
government taking equivalent to taxation.'" The conclusion, how-
ever, that Period Two reneging would make the government bigger,
rather than smaller, did not rely upon the fact that Jill may have been
told in Period One that she had a contract right to repayment. Sup-
pose the government chose instead to levy a $10.00 tax on Jill in Pe-
riod One. Then, in Period Two, suppose it had to choose between (a)
doing nothing and (b) levying a tax of $5.50 on both Bill and Jill and
handing the $11.00 to Jill (or alternatively just taking $5.50 from Bill
and handing it to Jill). The allocative and distributional consequences
of (b) generally would be the same as those from honoring the bond
in the first example. Thus, despite the absence of a Period One prom-
ise to Jill to even out the distribution in Period Two, option (b) would
continue to imply a smaller government overall. From the standpoint
of nominal cash flows, however, option (b) would appear to involve
even bigger government than in the earlier example. Indeed, if the
government went through the motions of levying a $5.50 tax on both
individuals and then handing $11.00 back to Jill (rather than simply
taking $5.50 from Bill and giving it to Jill), then Period Two would
involve both "taxes" and "spending" of $11.00.
The key to this example in each of its variants—and to current
real-world tax cuts that lead to future reductions in Social Security and
Medicare spending—is that the Period Two decision comes in mid-
stream. It is easy to accept that government would have been smaller in
the example if taxes and spending had been zero in both periods.
Once the government takes action, however, an immediate shutdown—
even one constrained by honoring express contractual commitments in
place—does not necessarily lead to a smaller government. It may in-
stead lead to increased redistribution if the alternative in Period Two
would have been to even things out on an all-periods basis.
104 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 90, at 99-100.
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C. Evaluating the Likely Effects of the 2001-2003 Tax Cuts on the Allocative
and Distributional Size of Government
1. The Need for Offsetting Future Tax Increases and Social Security
and Medicare Cuts
In evaluating how the 2001-2003 tax cuts will affect the size of
government, an initial problem is that they are only part of the story.
Over time, under what economists call the long-term budget con-
straint, the present value of government inflows and outlays must be
equal. Only resources on hand can be spent, and everything ulti-
mately must be paid for (the no-free-lunch principle). Accordingly,
reducing cash inflows through the tax cuts implies compensating
changes, in the form of reduced outlays or offsetting future tax in-
creases relative to the case of non-enactment. What ought to be evalu-
ated, then, is the entire package, not the 2001-2003 tax cuts standing
alone. The problem analytically is that the rest of the package has not
yet been specified and will not be specified any time soon.
Fortunately, if that is the right word, our long-term fiscal picture
is clear enough to permit highly educated guesses about the broad
character of the offsets. An initial salient fact concerns the tension
between the longterm budget constraint and the announced long-
term fiscal policy path of the U.S. government. As noted above, the
fiscal gap or fiscal imbalance ("Fr) may stand at about $73 trillion,
whereas a "sustainable fiscal policy requires FI to be zero."1 °5
At some point, therefore, taxes will have to increase or spending
will have to decline. Moreover, to the extent that spending declines,
discretionary domestic spending is too small a component to bear the
major brunt. Social Security and Medicare cuts will almost certainly
have to do most of the heavy lifting on the spending side. Thus, it was
'recently estimated, prior to the 2003 tax cut, that, in principle, the FI
could be eliminated by (a) raising federal income tax collections by
68.5%, (b) raising payroll tax collections by 94%, (c) cutting discre-
tionary spending by 104.1% (which is not only mathematically impos-
sible but also would imply no defense budget), or (d) cutting Social
Security and Medicare outlays by 45.3%." 0
Accordingly, in specifying the full package of changes associated
with the 2001-2003 tax cuts, two main possibilities merit attention.
GOKIIAI,E 8c SmErrEits, supra note 45, at 2. I henceforth will use the terms fiscal im-
balance ("FI") and fiscal gap interchangeably.
106 See id. at 96 tbl.4.
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The first is that the tax cuts are offset by future tax increases. The sec-
ond is that they are offset by future Social Security and Medicare
cuts. 107 Each of these two options can then be evaluated for its size of
government effects.
2. Offsetting Future Tax Increases and the Size of Government
The enactment of substantial future tax increases should not be
discounted on the ground that the current political environment is so
vehemently anti-tax. Things may look very different once the payment
of Social Security and Medicare benefits is at risk. I have suggested
elsewhere that, within the next fifteen years, the enactment of a con-
sumption-style value-added tax ("VAT") on top of the existing income
tax, and the use of inflation as a deliberate policy tool for partly re-
neging on current. obligations, are significant possibilities.m This, of
course, is just speculation, and we really do not know what the tax in-
creases will be. We can confidently predict, however, two things about
them if enacted. First, because the tax increases will not take effect
until the future, they will result in the application of higher tax rates
to future than to current economic activity. Second, by applying
mainly to younger or future taxpayers by today's perspective, they will
result in the application of generally higher lifetime net taxes and tax
rates to younger . than older generations. The former of these two
points matters allocatively, while the latter matters distributionally.
For two reasons, the application of higher tax rates to future than
to current economic activity is likely to cause added economic distor-
tion, and thus is likely to increase the real size of government by mag-
nifying its impact on economic production. First, the application of
higher tax rates to future than to current activity may induce taxpay-
ers to shift taxable transactions from high-tax to low-tax years, espe-
cially as the transition nears and begins to take a more definite and
predictable form. Second, even if economic activity cannot shift be-
tween years, the application of higher rates to some years and lower
rates to other years tends to increase total economic distortion. It is a
public economics truism that the deadweight loss from a tax generally
rises more than proportionately with the rate of the tax, and indeed
with the square of the rate. 109 Thus, for example, Idloubling a tax
107 Given the preexisting FI, one or both of these changes would have been necessary
even without the 2001-2003 tax cuts, but the tax cuts increase their necessary magnitude.
1 °8 See SHAVIRO, supra note 44, at 148.
109 See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 294 (5th ed. 1999).
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quadruples its excess burden, other things being the same. "110 This
suggests that overall distortion will be higher if the rates are high in
some years and low in others than if they are constant at the interme-
diate rate required for long-term revenue equivalence. That is, the
reduction in distortion in low-rate years will be more than offset by
the increase in distortion in high-rate years.
Accordingly, to the extent that the 2001-2003 tax cuts are offset
by future tax increases, they seem likely to increase the size of gov-
ernment allocatively. Only if the newly enacted taxes were a great deal
less distortive than those they replaced would this conclusion be likely
to change. Distributionally, however, it seems even clearer that the
package of current tax cuts plus future tax increases makes the size of
government larger. Indeed, the distributional impact is really the big
enchilada—persisting in the scenario in which Social Security and
Medicare benefits are cut—that makes the big-government character
of the 2001-2003 tax cuts almost indisputable.
Consider again that recent generational accounting forecasts sug-
gest that future generations, if left to bear the entire FI, will face life-
time net tax rates more than double those being imposed on any cur-
rent generations." One need not exaggerate the extent to which
proportionate tax rates offer a definite non-redistributive baseline in
order to see that this implies sizeable transfers from future to current
generations. The imbalance is the product of having run Social Secu-
rity and Medicare on a somewhat Ponzi-like basis, in which early gen-
erations received free benefits, rather than reflecting an increase in
the in-kind services that future generations get from their greater net
tax payments." 2
The 2001-2003 changes exacerbated this redistribution from fu-
ture to current generations. By lowering current generations' already
low lifetime net tax rates in exchange for raising such rates for future
generations, the package of tax cuts now for tax increases later unmis-
takably increased the government's inter-generational redistributive
role. This effect is so significant that the package very likely made the
government larger in distributional terms, even if one assumes that
"0 Id.
"I See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
In See StrAvnto, supra note 44, at 76-91, for a fuller comparison of Social Security and
Medicare financing to a Ponzi scheme. In general, Social Security and Medicare have a less
"exploding" character than the classic Ponzi scheme, but they are subject to demographic
and technological shocks.
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the tax cuts reduced intra-generational redistribution, such as from
rich to poor, through the fiscal system.
3. Future Social Security and Medicare Cuts and the Size of
Government
The prior Subpart's conclusion may seem a bit too easy. It should
be no surprise that cutting taxes now in exchange for raising them in
the future fails to make the government smaller. Surely this was not
the scenario that proponents of the tax cuts envisioned, except inso-
far as they were seeking purely current political advantage rather than
pursuing a principled long-term policy of shrinking the government.
Part of the answer to any such challenge to this analysis is that the
proponents should have envisioned this scenario. Future tax increases
are only to be expected when one enacts massive tax cuts in the face
of a huge fiscal imbalance plus predictable future political pressures
to continue to provide Social Security and Medicare benefits with lit-
tle prospect of reducing the imbalance by decreasing discretionary
government spending. Still, to make the story complete, one also
must consider the scenario in which government spending on Social
Security and Medicare declines by reason of the increased FI created
by the tax cuts. Although seniors and the American Association of Re-
tired Persons bring enormous political power to defending Social Se-
curity and Medicare spending, relatively disguised or indirect cuts
may soon be politically possible, and in the long run, they really can-
not be avoided." 3
Looking at the 2001-2003 tax cuts as part of a package with fu-
ture Social Security and Medicare cuts does little to change the prior
Subpart's conclusion, however. Distributionally, it makes no differ-
ence at all (except insofar as different people bear the entitlements
cuts as opposed to the tax increases). Either way, lifetime net tax rates
are lowered where they are already relatively low and raised for
younger people and the members of future generations for whom the
rates would have been high in any event. A dollar is a dollar, whether
one is losing it in the form of extra gross tax payments or in the form
of reduced receipts through government transfers.
1 " Examples of cuts to Social Security and Medicare that might be politically feasible
at some point include raising eligibility ages, not fully indexing Social Security benefits to
inflation, and squeezing healthcare providers on their Medicare reimbursements even if
this causes many of them to drop out of the program.
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What about allocatively? Here, if anywhere, is where the tax cuts
might be expected to lead to smaller government. The allocative ef-
fects of Social Security and Medicare, however, taking as given their
transfer content, are much smaller than they might initially appear.
Under the influence of spending illusion, these two programs may
look like big government because the cash flows that pass through
them are so huge. In 2002, for example, government spending on the
two programs exceeded $750 billion." 4 Thus, it is natural to think of
these programs as having huge .allocative effects. This is misleading,
however. In point of fact, Social Security and Medicare are fairly bland
programs allocatively.
Social Security actually deals in cash, which people can spend as
they like, albeit not until retirement. It is a negative tax, paid to peo-
ple who previously paid positive taxes, and cutting it is thus very much
like increasing taxes directly. Therefore, cutting Social Security to in-
crease generational redistribution through the fiscal system should
not be thought of as creating smaller government even allocatively,
except in the sense that it reduces the effect of Social Security in re-
quiring people to save a portion of their lifetime incomes (net of
taxes and transfers) for retirement. This, of course, is hardly a benefit
to people who "escape" being forced to save for retirement by having
their savings simply taken away from them instead.
One subtlety about Social Security that makes analysis of its allo-
cative effects more complicated is that "most contributors are likely to
view the system's ... payroll tax as a pure tax" without counting as an
offsetting negative tax the marginal benefits that they accrue by work-
ing and earning more.115 Thus, even an individual whose net lifetime
Social Security tax was zero might be deterred from working by the
burden of the Social Security tax as considered without regard to the
accrual of benefits. One should keep in mind, however, that, even
with future benefit cuts, the taxes needed to pay off already accrued
benefits (or those that for any other reason are politically hard to
eliminate) are likely to be very high, and that cutting taxes now
probably means that they will need to be still higher in the future
(and thus more distortionary for the reasons discussed in the prior
"4 See 2004 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT, supra. note 5, at 3, tbl.I.C1 (stating that total
Medicare expenditures at the end of 2002 were $280.8 billion); 2004 OASDI TRUSTEES
REPORT, supra note 43, at 4 tb1.11.131 (providing that total Social Security expenditures in
2003 were $479.1 billion).
115
 Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Jeffrey Sachs, It's High Time to Privatize, BROOKINGS REV.,
Summer 1997, at 16, 18.
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Subpart). Immediately reducing the accrual of future Social Security
benefits, if that indeed affects the political likelihood that they will be
paid, would have been considerably more constructive than allowing
them to keep accruing unchecked and simply tightening the fiscal
vise that all taxes and spending will face in the future.
Medicare, concededly, has allocative effects that Social Security
lacks because of its in-kind benefits." 6 Seniors get healthcare, albeit
furnished by private providers rather than directly by the government,
even when they would prefer the cash, and with rules poorly designed
to give them an incentive to economize on healthcare that offers only
modest or negligible benefits.'" Its incentive and income effects have
surely been huge contributors to the enormous growth of healthcare
expenditure in recent decades, both absolutely and relative to the
economy. 118 Moreover, the administering government agency (the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services) prepares comprehensive
price lists for covered medical services and monitors millions of pay-
ment requests. Thus, in an important respect, the government might
be smaller allocatively if Medicare expenditures declined and the
program's impact on the economy thereby was lessened.
Yet even this effect can be overstated easily. For one thing, as em-
pirical research has shown, healthcare is an area in which consumers'
price-sensitivity is relatively low." 9 Being healthy is a high priority, and
doctors often make treatment decisions for their patients (who may
lack the expertise to use their own judgment) on diagnostic grounds
that reflect only limited consideration of cost. 120 Thus, although price
sensitivity is great enough to suggest that Medicare could save billions
of dollars if restructured to make patients and doctors more cost-
conscious at the margin, the allocative effects nonetheless appear to be
small, taking as given the income effects, relative to the dollars in-
volved. As for the distributional effects, although Medicare may result
in significant lifetime redistribution within an age cohort because some
individuals get so much more than others, the package of current tax
cuts plus future Medicare cuts (beyond those that would otherwise
116
 In addition, because one does not earn additional Medicare benefits at the margin
by working more (once one has become eligible, as nearly everyone who reaches retire-
ment age does), the taxes that pay for the benefits would deter work at the margin even if
people correctly understood the entire program.
117 See SHAVIRO, supra note 44, at 26-33.
118 See id.
118 See id. at 29-30 (discussing the RAND Corporation study of general cost conscious-
ness in healthcare).
140 See id. at 29-32.
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have been necessary) is likely to increase the already huge redistribu-
tion from younger to older generations through the program.'"
Even for Medicare, therefore, it is plausible that a package of the
2001-2003 tax cuts plus future benefit cuts would make the govern-
ment larger on balance. The bottom line would depend on how one
compared the reduction in the government's allocative effects to the
likely net increase in its redistributive effects. When one considers
that tax increases and Social Security cuts are likely as well, however,
and that these more clearly increase the size of government, the case
that the tax cuts will probably, over time, make the government larger
on balance becomes quite powerful. The overall package is one of
much greater redistribution to older generations, accompanied by
only a possibility of reduced allocative effects.
Looking beyond the tax cuts themselves to the overall budget
policy of the Bush administration, the case for an increase in the size
of government becomes almost irrefutable. This, after all, is an ad-
ministration that in its first two years increased federal outlays by $222
billion, or from 18.4% to 19.4% of GDP.' 22 Only about 40% of this
increase was for defense spending, suggesting that one could not at-
tribute all (or even most) of it to the events of September 11, 2001. 125
By its third year, the Bush administration was busy procuring a new
$16.6 trillion Medicare prescription drug benefit.'"
If nothing else, this new drug benefit effectively exploded any
notion that the 2001-2003 tax cuts were aimed at shrinking the gov-
ernment's allocative effects via Medicare, because simply recouping
the expansion of government from this new benefit would be a chal-
lenge. Rather, the Bush administration appears to be seeking short-
term political advantage and favors for particular groups, deceptively
clothed in anti-government rhetoric. Then again, conservative ideo-
logues of the Grover Norquist genre, 125 even when opposed to the
Bush administration's spending increases, appear no less convinced
than the Bush administration itself (if it is sincere) that tax cuts
somehow have a greater impact on the size of government than
121
 Medicare does not, however, result in significant, if any, progressive redistribution.
See id. at 34-36.
122 See BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 1, at 129-30 tbls.F-1, F-2.
123 See id. at 135 tbl.F-7.
124 See 2004 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 5, at 109 tb1.11.C23.
123 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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spending increases. 126 They evidently do not, or choose not to, under-
stand the long-term budget constraint, under which a dollar of added
government outlays today, if it does not reduce expected future out-
lays (which more likely it would increase, given the effect on political
expectations), implies added taxes with a present value of a dollar.
The above analysis suggests, however, that the 2001-2003 tax cuts
likely would not have moved fiscal policy in a smaller-government di-
rection even if the Bush administration had been interested in re-
straining spending.
4. Transition to a Smaller Government?
One possible response to my suggestion that Republican tax-
cutting increased the size of government involves arguing for a longer
time frame. To be sure, people tell me, Republican tax-cutting has
increased the already huge transfers from future generations to cur-
rent seniors. They surmise, however, that the tax cuts are pointing us
towards a new steady state in which the government will henceforth
be smaller because it no longer will be able to afford big programs
such as current Social Security and Medicare. 127
If this scenario of transition to a stable new small-government
steady state made any practical sense, there would indeed be a genuine
tradeoff. The government would be transferring more wealth between
individuals today, but in the future steady state, it might indeed be do-
ing less. Thus, the issue would be which time frame mattered to you.
Unfortunately, this scenario, which few if any of its proponents
have thought through with any thoroughness, is far-fetched at best. I
call it the "manana scenario," as in, "We cannot. take any responsible
steps to rein in the entitlements programs today, and indeed, we are
expanding them. But fear not, because we will do it all maliana." I
also call it the "come the revolution scenario," as in, "Come the revo-
126
 An example is provided by Stephen Moore, the President of the Club for Growth, an
influential private campaign organization that, according to its website, seeks to elect candi-
dates who "support the Reagan vision of limited government and lower taxes." See THE CLUB
FOB GROW111, ABOUT Us, at http://www.clubforgrowth.org/about.php (last visited Oct. 15,
2004). A recent New York Times Magazine profile of Stephen Moore notes, As Moore read-
ily admits, spending has multiplied like a virus in Washington under Bush and the Republi-
can Congress, but while the club gleefully goes after moderates on taxes, it has yet to take
aim at a single conservative for going soft on spending." Matt Bai, Fight Club, N.Y. Twit's, Aug.
10, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
127
 It seems not to have occurred to anyone taking this view that, in this state of affairs,
the government also might be unable to afford costly foreign military interventions.
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lotion, we will be able to do all of the tough things that we are simply
too politically afraid to do today."
Obviously,: the questions are, "What mailana?" and "What revolu-
tion?" Why, or;ort what ground, do these people think that the politics
of the future will be so different from the present that all of the hard
choices, put off 'today will be feasible then? Have they really consid-
ered the political scenarios that the threat of an impending credit col-
lapse by the U.S. government, which seems to be what they expect,
would most likely involve?
Although I will postpone a fuller examination of these scenarios
to the next Part, which examines the significance of the fiscalag 13, 1213 a
few main points ,that relate to the size of government are worth mak-
ing here. First, plainly it is true that an enormous fiscal gap creates
strong pressure not to increase outlays, and indeed it creates pressure
to reduce them. Again, however, this is not necessarily the same as
reducing the size of government. The effect at any time may be to in-
crease generational redistribution, as the elderly in each period con-
tinue to push fiscal burdens forward, playing "hot potato" with
younger voters, who generally are less politically organized. A scenario
of continuously increasing lifetime net tax rates, which certainly can-
not be ruled out here, is far indeed from the small-government, lim-
ited-redistribution Valhalla.
Second, the revenue pressure on the government may be so
great—especially with seniors clamoring against benefit cuts—that it
simply cannot be met through the type of straightforward, visible,
widely distributed tax increases that are generally most efficient. For
example, the use of inflation or even hyper-inflation to ease the fiscal
crunch is likely to become very tempting. Stealth tax increases and
ostensibly one-time takings from various groups also may become the
order of the day. An example of the latter would be using inflation to
devalue outstanding, non-indexed government bonds.
Third, the use of regulatory mandates to impose burdens on one
group in exchange for benefits to another group will become ever
more tempting as a substitute for the government spending that would
have been financed (in many cases, more equitably and efficiently) by
broad-based taxes. The fiscal restraint era of the late 1980s through the
1990s provided ample advance warning of this likely trend. One exam-
ple was the Clinton administration's 1994 healthcare plan, which would
have relied on employer mandates to provide much of the financing
128 See infra notes 134-156 and accompanying text.
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off budget. 129 As it happened, this effort failed, in part because small
business owners were politically well-positioned to resist the mandates.
Other major new mandates of the era, however, such as the Americans
with Disabilities Act, demonstrated how much could be done this
way.'" A fiscal gap encourages the use of mandates even when they im-
pose more targeted burdens, are more intrusive, and are less efficient
than outlays financed through general revenues.
Finally, the sheer uncertainty that results from having a huge fiscal
gap with no resolution in sight makes the government, in a sense, more
intrusive. By cutting taxes and increasing spending, Congress has
pointed a loaded gun at its own head (or rather at the heads of future
Congresses), but we do not know when and how the gun will go off.
Thus, anyone engaged in long-term planning, such as for retirement,
must deal with considerable uncertainty about future government pol-
icy. For example, should you save more for your retirement because you
simply cannot count on any specific component of the existing Social
Security and Medicare commitments? Or should you instead save less
because a big part of narrowing the fiscal gap will probably be to
squeeze the people who had enough foresight to plan properly?
This is not just a matter of making it harder for people to forecast
future government policy (and to insure adequately against the down-
side) when they make retirement plans. Having a huge fiscal gap that
remains unaddressed is a surefire political formula for making all of
the competing interest groups in Washington continually invest heav-
ily in seeking to influence future government policy. Nothing is really
safe, and no government commitment can be taken for granted for
more than a few years. With even Social Security and Medicare likely
to be on the chopping block, no group can afford to rely on political
inertia to protect what it now has. This is an enviable setting for fund-
raising by politicians.
President Bush admittedly inherited the FI, which results mainly
from advances in life expectancy and healthcare technology that
make Social Security and Medicare ever more expensive, but the con-
sistent central feature of his fiscal policy has been to increase it as
129 See SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 102.
00 See id. (observing that, by mandating billions of dollars of private expenditures to
provide building access and job opportunities to the disabled, the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act expanded the federal government's reach in a manner not reflected in direct gov-
ernment expenditures).
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much as politically possible. 131 Both in 2001 and 2003, the current
administration and the Republican majority in Congress went out of
their way to make the fiscal system even less stable, and unstable
sooner, than if they merely had been larding an already immense FI.
The mechanism of choice was the sunsets, which provided that the
entire 2001 Act, and many of the provisions in the 2003 Act, would
expire (barring further legislation) within periods ranging from two
to nine years. 132 Although the main reason for the sunsets was to lower
the official ten-year estimates of the Acts' revenue cost, deceptive
bookkeeping and gaming of the budgetary rules designed to induce
long-term fiscal responsibility were only part of the effect)" A further
effect, unacknowledged but not necessarily unforeseen, was to guar-
antee that Congress would have to continue considering major tax
legislation throughout the foreseeable future. For example, would
interested parties with millions of dollars at stake really do nothing as
the scheduled disappearance of bonus depreciation in 2005, or of es-
tate tax repeal in 2011, grew nearer? Indeed, would not lobbying over
permanent extension of the expiring tax cuts be expected to com-
mence immediately? Congress could not have done more than it did
in 2001 and 2003 to ensure that the size of government, in the sense
of the resources devoted to trying to influence its ongoing decisions,
would be as high as possible for years to come.
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FISCAL GAP
A. How Important Is a Measure of Currently Stated or Inferred Policy?
Part 1 of this Article showed that the United States entered the
twenty-first century with a huge fiscal gap (notwithstanding budget
surpluses at the time), that was made significantly larger by the tax
cuts of 2001-2003. 134 Part II demonstrated that the tax cuts, in light of
the redistribution from younger to older generations that will result
from the need for compensating changes such as future tax increases
and cuts in Social Security and Medicare, probably will not advance
their presumed rationale of making the government effectively
smaller. 133 Disposing of this rationale, however, still leaves the ques-
151
 In both 2001 and 2003, still larger tax cuts would have been enacted but for politi-
cal resistance in the Senate.
152 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 70, at 1553.
155 See id.
154 See supra notes 13-84 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 85-133 and accompanying text.
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tion of how the tax cuts, through their effect on the fiscal gap, actually
ought to be evaluated. This requires evaluating the long-term
significance of the fiscal gap—an issue that, understandably, has re-
ceived less attention to date than the necessary groundwork of
defining and quantifying it.
The fiscal gap is merely an accounting measure concerning a set
of statements made actually or implicitly by policymakers. One takes a
set of rules on the books, fleshes them out by inferring the future
policies implied by government programs that have not been legally
specified beyond the current year, and then measures their degree of
consistency with the long-term budget constraint. The detection of a
fiscal gap means that the above statements about future policy cannot
all be correct, and thus that they will have to change.
One line of thought that I have encountered, though not seen in
writing, responds by asking, so what? The government's statements
about future policy change all the time, and its statements about pol-
icy in the distant future are not very meaningful yet. The mere fact
that the statements will have to change does not mean that anything is
seriously wrong. We should worry about fundamentals, not about
whether some given set of policy statements are sustainable under ex-
pected economic and demographic conditions.
This critique might further be spelled out to include the follow-
ing arguments:
• Isn't the performance and growth of our economy far more im-
portant than the fiscal gap? And doesn't the growth-proof nature
of the fiscal gap indicate that it is less important than it seems? In
illustration, suppose that your present-law Social Security and
Medicare benefits would be worth $X at retirement if the economy
grows only moderately, but $5X if the ballyhooed "New Economy"
of late-1990s wishful thinking should come roaring back to life.
Isn't the ultimate value of your benefits more important than
whether they satisfy the current policy commitment to peg them to
the economy? Wouldn't one prefer, for example, to receive $2X
under the high-growth scenario (despite the sixty percent default
relative to current policy) than $X in the low-growth scenario?
• Is it so terrible that current Social Security and Medicare policy is
unsustainable? Doesn't such a view presuppose (as politicians
with a survival instinct must, but commentators with academic
tenure need not) that the endangered policy is good?
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• Why worry about the impact on future generations? They may
well be richer than we are; why is redistribution from them to us
so terrible?
• Given that the fiscal gap results principally from two good
things—increasing life expectancies and advances in medical
technology—shouldn't we be glad on balance that we have it?
Would we really be better off if people died sooner and could not
be helped as often by medical treatment?
These arguments may have some credence, yet the picture they draw
is quite misleading. Although not entirely incorrect, they are seriously
incomplete, and thus, their suggestion that the fiscal gap is not cause
for alarm should be rejected. Because they have some substance,
however, the rest of this Part addresses them in turn."°
B. Isn't the Performance and Growth of Our Economy More Important Than.
the Fiscal Gap?
Given the growth-proof character of the fiscal gap, reflecting that
outlays as well as revenues are pegged to the size of the economy, I
have elsewhere analogized our current fiscal policy to a hypothetical
alimony agreement in a divorce between a high-earning corporate
executive and his non-working spouse, in which the parties agree that
each year he will pay her 30% of his salary, and she will get 50% of his
salary."7 We know this is impossible. No matter how much or little he
earns, the 30% that he is supposed to pay cannot equal the 50% that
she is supposed to get. Moreover, growth in his salary does nothing to
resolve this divergence, and, indeed, makes it larger as measured in
absolute dollars. Yet it seems as if the parties ought both to do rea-
sonably well, no matter where between 30% and 50% they settle
things, so long as he continues to earn large amounts of money.
Nonetheless, it is also clear that the lack of a feasible agreement
could be quite detrimental to both of them. For example, they might
collectively spend more than 100% of the available funds. They might
dissipate the wealth in costly litigation, or they might end up in a
situation in which he, facing arrears, has lost his marginal incentive to
earn. "8 The lack of a feasible agreement, therefore, in a bad scenario,
1 " See infin notes 137-156 and accompanying text.
157 See Shaviro, supra note 61, at 5,
758 See id.
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might destroy the high earnings that seemingly were more fundamen-
tal to their welfare.
In the present setting of U.S. fiscal policy, this is no idle story. Bit-
ter political conflict is likely in the future as seniors' Social Security
and Medicare benefits are endangered, and the choice between cut-
ting benefits more, or raising taxes on younger people more, becomes
politically unavoidable. Insofar as higher taxes are adopted, they may
affect incentives to work and to save and may promote widespread tax
cheating (pitted against rising enforcement efforts) along with the
growth of the black market economy. People's long-range planning,
whether for career choice, business investment, or their own retire-
ment, will be made more difficult by the lack of any predictable policy
path. Politically, although the government grows more unpopular be-
cause it cannot meet its commitments and must raise taxes, rent-
seeking activity aimed at influencing its decisions will become more
prevalent with so much of its policy in play.
Additionally, Laurence Kotlikoff and Scott Burns identify two
more definite reasons why deferring any response to the fiscal gap
may end up significantly reducing economic growth.'" First, because
of the tax hikes on workers needed to support contemporaneous sen-
iors, capital shadowing, or a reduction in the amount of capital in-
vested per worker, is likely to take place. 14° This is an income effect,
rather than an aspect of tax rates, reflecting that younger people tend
to save more than seniors because they have greater future needs. It is
no less real for being an income effect, however, and it suggests that
"we're likely to see a decline in capital per worker, labor productivity,
and real wages (apart from any increases in the latter two variables
associated with technological progress). "141
Second, and potentially even worse, however, is the scenario of
fiscal distress experienced recently by such countries as Brazil and Ar-
gentina. 142 Governments that are unable to meet their outstanding
commitments in any politically tolerable way are prone to respond by
printing money, thereby generating hyper-inflation. 143 This in itself
139 LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF & SCOT'. BURNS, THE COMING GENERATIONAL STORM 94-
100, 122 (2004).
14° Id. at 99-100.
141 Id. at 95.
142 See id. at 92-94, 122.
143 Printing money offers three short-term benefits to governments: from seignorage
(they can actually get value for the paper they print), from devaluing both the official
debt, and from devaluing other spending commitments to the extent not indexed to infla-
tion. Id. at 125.
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can be economically destructive, for example, by increasing financial
uncertainty and forcing the use of barter rather than money. Even
before hyper-inflation emerges, however, nominal interest rates may
skyrocket as soon as financial markets begin to anticipate it as a likely
response. Moreover, real interest rates may skyrocket even if the gov-
ernment initially resists the temptation to print money, leading to re-
cession (because fewer business investments can meet the hurdle rate
from borrowing) and making the temptation all the greater. Thus,
actual government default becomes ever more likely because cheap
borrowing to float the annual budget deficit is no longer an option.
As Laurence Kotlikoff and Scott Burns note, Brazil has seen inter-
est rates on government, bonds rise to 27% even though the inflation
rate is below 10%, reflecting widespread expectations that it will de-
fault,'" Argentina has seen a major economic meltdown, featuring
bank failures, high inflation, an 80% currency devaluation, a one-third
reduction in output, and a 25% unemployment rate. 145 Solutions to this
sort of fiscal crisis are elusive until the government places its policy on a
sustainable course, both actually permitting it to meet its commitments
and persuading the capital markets that it has things in order. This may
require, as in Russia, coldbloodedly sacrificing the welfare of one gen-
eration of the elderly, whose benefits are renounced, in order to
benefit all future generations. 146 Laurence Kotlikoff and Scott Burns
suggest, however, that the most likely outcome is a bad steady state (al-
beit mitigated by technological advances), featuring chronic inflation,
high interest rates, and periodic bank and currency crises."'
This scenario presently may seem farfetched for the United
States, but consider the following thought experiment. Because the
fiscal gap is currently estimated at about $73 trillion, what would hap-
pen today if the U.S. Treasury tried to issue $73 trillion worth of
bonds without offering any credible plan to finance the bonds by
sufficiently raising taxes or to reduce government outlays? 148
 This un-
doubtedly would far exceed the U.S. Treasury's credit-worthiness, not
to mention market demand for the bonds, particularly if other coun-
tries with comparable or greater fiscal gaps simultaneously did the
144 Id. at 122. This is simply a loss to taxpayers (and presumably on balance to Brazil-
ians) insofar as Brazil really is not going to default but cannot persuade lenders of this.
145 KoluxoFF & BURNS, supra note 139, at 136-37.
"6 Id. at 140.
147 see id.
148 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text for an explanation of the $73 trillion
fiscal gap.
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same thing. 199
 It thus would be expected to lead to skyrocketing inter-
est rates and serious questioning of the U.S. government's solvency.
How does the actual current fiscal course compare to this? One
trivial difference is that at least we will get to roll out our demand for
credit a bit more gradually, and thus avoid a crunch caused purely by
momentary illiquidity. A more important difference is that we will not
need to sell bonds with a 2003 present value as great as $73 trillion to
the extent that we change our fiscal policy by raising taxes and reduc-
ing outlays. At present, however, this appears to be so difficult politi-
cally that one cannot place much faith in it. We will be lucky, over the
next few years, if policy changes do not make the fiscal gap
significantly larger. Even if there is no policy change, by 2008, the FI is
projected to rise by more than 20% to $54 trillion, due purely to the
passage of time, and in particular, to the ever-nearing retirement of
people in the baby boom generation.'"
Leaving aside these points, however, the implications of a $73
trillion fiscal gap are not much changed by the fact that we are not
immediately seeking to borrow that amount on the capital markets.
The present value, in 2003 terms, of the amount that it appears we
will have to borrow is not changed by waiting. Deferral only means
that the amount we need grows at a market interest rate, here as-
sumed not to include inflation and default premia. Thus, anyone who
thinks that the U.S. government would not be able to borrow $73 tril-
lion on reasonable terms today, and that policy changes narrowing
the fiscal gap are too much to hope for until such time as the capital
market reaction begins to be felt, should take very seriously the pros-
pect that we are headed along the same path as Brazil and Argentina.
The Bush administration's share of the blame for this state of af-
fairs goes beyond the tax cuts and spending increases that it has
pushed to enactment, along with those to be added in the near future
if the sunset provisions are extended or repealed. It is to be blamed as
well for relentlessly pushing its tax-cutting ideology without any con-
cern for spending discipline, and thus for creating a political atmos-
phere in which urging fiscal responsibility is close to impossible. The
Bush administration is likely to get the blame it deserves when people
ten to twenty years from now look back in search of the causes of the
problems they are facing.
149 Among the countries with larger fiscal gaps relative to GDP than the United States are
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and Sweden. KOTLIKOFF & BURNS,
supra note 139, at 137.
m See GORHALE & SMETTERS, sepia note 45, at 27 tb1.2.
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People also will remember the difference between this admini-
stration and, say, the Reagan administration, which, after its "riverboat
gamble" tax cut in 1981, agreed to deficit-reducing tax increases in
1982 and 1984. 151 The Reagan administration also can share the
credit for the bipartisan 1983 Social Security changes, which im-
proved that program's fiscal posture and that of the government as a
whole. 152 The Reagan administration also avoided involving itself in
anything akin to the Bush administration's proposal to create an un-
funded new prescription drug entitlement in Medicare. When a ma-
jor new Medicare benefit, for catastrophic coverage of seniors' medi-
cal expenses beyond the program's limits, was (temporarily) added
late during its time in office, the Reagan administration agreed that
this should be done on a fully funded basis.'"
C. Why Does It Matter That Current Social Security and
Medicare Are Unsustainable?
People who anticipate relying on Social Security and Medicare for
their retirement support will need little persuasion that the fiscal gap,
by endangering their benefits, is actually a serious problem. Nor will
people who are ideologically attached to the programs and their New
Deal/Great Society provenance. What, however, if one is more of a
skeptic about these programs' merits and current design? What, how-
ever, if one is more of a skeptic about these programs' merits and cur-
rent design? Then one may regard the threat that the fiscal gap poses
to them (reflecting their contribution to it) with more equanimity. In-
deed, one might even hope, though with what political prospects is un-
clear, that the fiscal gap will prompt arguably desirable changes to the
programs, such as raising retirement ages in the hope of inducing peo-
151 See JOON W. SLOAN, THE REAGAN EFFECT 152-65 (1999). Then-Senate Majority
leader and fellow Republican Howard Baker called President Ronald Reagan's Economic
and Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA"), which reduced individual income tax rates for all
taxpayers and provided $350 billion of tax relief for business (the largest tax cut in Ameri-
can history), a "riverboat gamble." Id. at 140, 156. Due to concerns about budget deficits
and Social Security savings, however, Congress passed tax increases in 1982, 1983, and
1984, all of which President Reagan signed into law. Id. at 157. The most significant of
these was the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA"), which was in-
tended to raise $98.3 billion over three years and regain 25% of the 1981 tax benefits. Id.
152 See id. at 85, 90.
155 See, e.g., RICHARD HIMELFARB, CATASTROPHIC POLITICS: TILE RISE AND FALL OF THE
MEDICARE CATASTROPHIC COVERAGE ACT OF 1988, at 33-34 (1995). Opposition by seniors
to the requirement that they collectively pay for their coverage led to repeal of the benefit
in 1989, during (but over the opposition of) the administration of the first President Bush.
See id. at 91-92.
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pie to work longer, or restructuring Medicare to induce greater cost-
consciousness by enrollees and their healthcare providers.'"
There are very good reasons, however, for having programs that
require people to save a portion of their lifetime incomes, net of taxes
and transfers, for their retirements, and to take this retirement saving
in the form of inflation-indexed life annuities and health insurance
coverage. 155 The central problem is that people tend to be myopic,
and thus tend to violate the principles of lifetime consumption
smoothing that rationality would seem to dictate. Accordingly, their
welfare may be improved by forcing the consumption smoothing on
them. Forced consumption smoothing also may have positive exter-
nalities if people who entered retirement with inadequate saving and
health insurance coverage otherwise would be supported by need-
based transfers.
However true it may be that Social Security and Medicare ought
to change significantly, simply cutting retirement benefits, unless com-
pleted as part of a fair and sensible overall distribution of the costs of
meeting the fiscal gap, risks harming seniors who have not adequately
provided for their own retirement saving. Indeed, this raises the possi-
bility that people who break even, or better, financially as a result of
the 2001-2003 tax cuts (plus offsetting future tax increases and benefit
cuts) will end up having lower lifetime welfare as a result.
D. What Is Wrong with Burdening Future Generations, Who May Be
Considerably Wealthier Than We Are?
Whether the Bush administration realizes it or not, in one sense,
its tax policy may prove to have been highly progressive. By transfer-
ring wealth from future to current generations, it may be taking
money from the relatively rich and giving it to the relatively poor. This
depends, of course, on just how badly the fiscal gap hurts future eco-
nomic performance, on whether things otherwise go well in the fu-
ture (the fiscal gap is hardly the only threat we face), and on just how
large the transfers are. For many decades, however, driven by techno-
logical advances, the United States has been growing steadily wealth-
ier (periodic business cycle downturns aside). Worker productivity
and real per capita GDP have been continually on the rise. 158 Techno-
154 Set generally SnAvnto, supra note 98; Stinvato, supra note 44.
115
 See generally Slim/ ma, supra note 98; S ► Avnio, supra note 44.
156 See U.S, CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at
419 tb1.633 (2003), available at www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/labor.pdf; U.S.
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logical advances are certain to continue, and they will tend, unless
overwhelmed by other factors, to keep these trends operating.
Moreover, trends in real per capita GDP actually may understate
the real improvement in material conditions that technology brings
over time. To be sure, various disamenities that GDP ignores, such as
pollution and over-crowded highways, may worsen. On the positive side
of the ledger, however, GDP includes goods and services at their market
prices without regard to consumer surplus, or the amount in excess of
the price that one would have been willing to pay if necessary.
Consider electrification and the spread of car and air travel hi the
first half of the twentieth century, followed more recently by gadgets
ranging from microwave ovens to personal computers to cellular
phones to DVD players. Or consider that millions of people still live
who were born at a time when penicillin had not yet been introduced,
and pneumonia was known as the "old person's friend." The amount
that we would be willing to pay for antibiotics to cure pneumonia, and
that people for centuries would have been willing to pay, surely is far
greater than its cost. Improvements in life expectancy and healthcare
treatment options indicate that things really have been getting better,
and may continue to do so, in a fundamentally important sense.
One might ask, therefore, what is wrong with the Bush admini-
stration's fiscal policy. Taking money from richer people and giving it
to poorer people is frequently considered a central aim of distribution
policy. Should we applaud the generational consequences of increas-
ing the fiscal gap, subject only to our degree of confidence that things
will nonetheless actually be getting better overall?
Generational equity is a rich topic, which I cannot explore fully
here. Suppose, however, that we consider a straight utilitarian frame-
work, in which the aim is to maximize aggregate well-being over time,
but we owe no specific duty to future generations other than weighing
their welfare equally per capita with ours. Such a framework tends to
favor progressive redistribution, subject to concern about its efficiency
costs, on the ground that wealth generally has declining marginal util-
ity. Accordingly, one might think that utilitarianism offers support for
significant redistribution from future to current generations, assmn-
ing again that technology really ,does assure that things will continue
to improve.
CENSUS BUREAU, Mini-Historical Statistics, in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF '111E UNITED STATES:
2003, 62 tbl.HS-33 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-33.pdf.
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For three reasons, however, the Bush administration's genera-
tional policy via the fiscal gap is dubious from a utilitarian standpoint.
First, GDP may understate the real improvement in material condi-
tions over time due to consumer surplus. If money can buy increas-
ingly better things as time passes, then people who live later might
value a marginal dollar more than their predecessors, even though
they are better off. Suppose that you could give a million dollars to
either of two individuals with brain tumors: one living in 2004 who
cannot be helped, or one living in 2054 who, at great expense, can be
cured. From a utilitarian standpoint, it is hard to argue against giving
the money to the latter individual, even if she is better-off. Thus, the
point about GDP understating the consumer surplus from techno-
logical advances actually leans against redistribution from future gen-
erations to us. We should not deprive them of the opportunity to en-
joy material benefits that are not even available to us in the first place.
Second, although living longer is a good thing, it indicates that
one needs greater resources. People who buy life annuities (or sup-
port Social Security's character as a life annuity) thereby honor the
principle that sometimes good things, rather than bad ones, need to
be "insured" against. Thus, even though future generations are pre-
sumably better-off than us insofar as they can expect to live longer,
this is reason (independent of the consumer goods available at any
point in time) for favoring them, rather than us, in distribution policy.
Third, utilitarian distribution policy is all about tradeoffs. Even
redistribution from rich to poor within the same age cohort (living
with the same technology) is not worthwhile on balance if the loss of
welfare from the efficiency cost exceeds the gain in welfare from
transferring resources to people who get greater marginal utility from
them. Recall the scenario whereby the fiscal gap generates not only
very high tax rates but also a capital market meltdown for the U.S.
government and financial structure, potentially with long-lasting ad-
verse macroeconomic effects. This suggests that, given how the politi-
cal system is likely to respond to the fiscal gap, increasing it is a very
costly and inefficient way of transferring resources from future to cur-
rent generations. We simply may be imposing too great a burden on
them for it to be worth the benefit to us even if our marginal utility of
a dollar is greater than theirs (and even if the meltdown is so far down
the road that those now living, or at least voting, need not worry
about facing it themselves).
Accordingly, although it is difficult to specify the optimal inter-
generational distribution policy, it is plausible that the fiscal gap
ought not, from this standpoint, to have been widened. This conclu-
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sion would be strengthened by any sense of moral obligation toward
future generations that discouraged over-burdening them or limiting
their capacity to enjoy a better life than ours.
E. Aren't the Lift Expectancy and Medical Technology Trends That Underlie
the Fiscal Gap Fundamentally Good Things?
A final point in dismissal of the fiscal gap might note that its two
main causes, increasing life expectancy and advances in medical tech-
nology, are actually good things. Would we really be better off if people
died sooner and could not be helped as often by medical treatment,
even though our long-term fiscal projections would then look much
better? Is alarmism about the fiscal gap therefore misplaced?
It is easy to agree that, in that scenario, we might be better off on
balance than we are today, but this does not change the fact that, in
our actual situation, unlike that hypothetical one, our fiscal policy
risks making things much worse than they need to be. Even if one
would rather be lucky than wise, it is better still to be both.
Suppose a rational individual, who knew she would have to pay
for her own retirement, faced an increase in life expectancy and bet-
ter (but costlier) medical treatment options in the future. She would
respond by saving more during her working years. Retirement saving
is more valuable if you will need to draw on it for a longer period and
can use it to greater effect than previously in improving your quality
of life. If she failed to do this, although she still might be glad on bal-
ance about the changes, her retirement years might be filled with re-
gret that she had failed to make the best use of her opportunities.
The same points hold for a. country that collectivizes retirement
financial risk by enacting social insurance programs for retirees. It
similarly ought to respond to rising life expectancies and costly
healthcare improvements by saving more collectively, whether
through private or government saving. Americans, however, like peo-
ple in many other countries, have resisted this course both in their
personal lives and in the policies they have selected through the po-
litical process. The fiscal gap reflects this failure, and shows that we
are doing unnecessarily badly in certain respects that we could con-
trol, even if in other respects we remain fortunate.
CONCLUSION
The Bush administration's policy of sharply cutting taxes while
increasing government spending is both misguided and harmful. Pre-
sumably rationalized in private as a way of shrinking government over
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the long term without paying a current political price, it in fact in-
creases the government's distributional intervention by handing
money to current voters at the expense of younger and future genera-
tions. The Bush administration's policies have increased the future
tax increases that are likely to be necessary. In addition, they are likely
to require additional Social Security and Medicare cuts that can be
seen in large part as negative taxes, refunding some of the positive
lifetime net taxes that future retirees will have paid by then. Reducing
future negative taxes is much like increasing future positive ones.
The fiscal gap is largely growth-proof because so much govern-
ment spending, no less than taxes, is effectively pegged to the size of
the economy. This means that we cannot outgrow it in the manner of
past wartime national debts. High economic growth concededly
would make default on the government's implicit obligations consid-
erably less painful. The fiscal gap, however, has the potential to re-
duce economic growth significantly for two main reasons. First, it may
result in large tax increases on workers to keep benefits flowing to
seniors, reducing saving because the workers would have saved more
of the transferred funds. Second, it may lead to an Argentina-style
meltdown in the U.S. government's position as a borrower in world
capital markets, potentially yielding chronic inflation, unemployment,
and bank and currency crises that would affect our economic produc-
tivity for an indefinite period.
The Bush administration's policy of increasing the fiscal gap ought
to be reversed as soon as possible, on both the tax and spending sides
of the ledger. How this ought to be done is beyond this Article's scope,
although I have discussed aspects of it elsewhere.'" Current seniors
ought to share in the burden, however, both through tax increases and
Social Security and Medicare reform that should take account of dif-
ferences in people's ability to pay. Unfortunately, policy changes in the
near future are more likely to make things worse than better.
151 See generally SHAVIR0, supra note 98; SitAvluo, supra note 44.
